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Summary 
 
Credibility assessments play a central part in refugee status determinations. The 
difficulty of adducing evidence to substantiate a claim for asylum renders applicants’ 
own testimonies extremely important, and by providing credible testimony an 
applicant may be given the benefit of the doubt and may thereby be able to meet the 
applicable standard of proof. In addition, this thesis argues that a positive finding of 
credibility is a vital step to being granted refugee status because it is only through 
credible testimony from the applicant herself that certain elements of the refugee 
definition can be satisfied. In spite of its importance, international refugee law does 
not stipulate how credibility assessments should be conducted. Domestic frameworks, 
too, are often vague on this topic. In this blurred context, three main pillars of 
credibility have evolved: internal consistency, external consistency, and plausibility. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to explore some of the problems that arise when 
decision-makers evaluate asylum applicants’ testimony according to these criteria, 
with particular focus on the cross-cultural setting of the refugee status determination.  
 
In its analysis of findings of internal inconsistency, the thesis focuses on three 
possible explanations for such discrepancies. The first is memory effects: this section 
concludes that human memory is generally not able to recall past experiences with 
complete consistency and accuracy. The second issue is the widespread use of 
interpreters in asylum processes, and it is demonstrated that this too is a potent source 
of internal inconsistencies. Thirdly, late disclosures of central aspects of applicants’ 
stories resulting in internal inconsistencies can often be explained by reference to 
applicants’ distrust in state authorities or the notions of privacy and shame that many 
applicants hold with regard to certain experiences. Moreover, the chapter on external 
consistency argues that findings of inconsistency between asylum applicants’ 
testimony and information about conditions in applicants’ countries of origin from 
other sources are more complex than is widely acknowledged. The contested nature of 
‘facts’ and the difficulty of viewing country of origin information (COI) as ‘objective 
evidence’ are discussed, and it is further argued that asylum decision-makers are 
generally not well equipped to assess whether there is consistency or not. With regard 
to assessments of the plausibility of applicants’ accounts, the thesis finds that such 
assessments are grounded on unspoken assumptions on the part of decision-makers as 
to what is plausible and what is not. The thesis discusses the role of the ‘reasonable 
man’ as an analytical tool in credibility assessments, but argues that this concept has 
little value in the cross-cultural context of the refugee status determination. It is 
further argued that assumptions about reasonable knowledge can be very misleading 
in credibility assessments, and that any reliance on applicants’ demeanour is 
inappropriate as a way to evaluate credibility.  
 
The thesis concludes that credibility assessments are all too often being conducted in 
ways that do not accurately separate fraudulent applicants from genuine ones, as the 
three grounds of credibility are frequently evaluated in ways that cannot properly 
distinguish between the two categories. Consequently, credibility assessments risk 
failing applicants who are genuinely at risk of being persecuted for a Convention 
reason. In response to these problems, the thesis offers a number of recommendations 
that are intended to be legally binding as international law and enforceable if they are 
not adhered to by decision-makers. 
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complete this thesis. I want to thank my supervisor, Professor Göran Melander, for his 
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discussion partners and proofreaders. You have provided me with new perspectives 
and your patient listening will late be forgotten. I also want to thank all my fellow 
students for making the spring of 2013 a rather enjoyable time to spend in the library. 
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fundamental knowledge of refugee law that enabled me to pursue this specialised 
topic, and it assured me that refugee law really is the area that I want to focus on in 
the future. In my view, it was the most inspiring course of the entire Masters 
programme. Lastly, I want to thank my family for their eternal love and support. You 
have given me the confidence to pursue my dreams and fight for what I believe to be 
right, even when this is not the easiest path to take. I have managed to complete this 
thesis only because of your unwavering encouragement and faith in me.  
 
I also want to take the opportunity to say a few words about why I have chosen to 
write about this topic. Law, understood as justice and equality for all persons, has 
always been of great interest to me. Meanwhile, I am fascinated by the diversity that 
human societies display. This led me to pursue studies in both law and social 
anthropology, and I have often wondered how these two areas of interest could be 
combined. Finally, I realised that refugee law draws on both. Refugeehood is relative 
to the applicant’s country of origin, yet the international laws of the Refugee 
Convention are the same for all. Looking further into this area, I found that the 
assessment of asylum applicants’ credibility as witnesses of their own life stories 
provides an extremely interesting object of study for the intersection of the two 
disciplines, strictly speaking a legal issue which nevertheless has so much to learn 
from other spheres of knowledge. Not much has been written about credibility 
assessments from this somewhat dual perspective. During the course of writing this 
thesis, I have become increasingly aware of the complexity of assessing credibility, 
which is further exacerbated by trying to reconcile legal processes with insights from 
other disciplines. This thesis attempts to contribute some new perspectives on 
credibility assessments, but its findings are only a starting point and I hope that this 
area of the refugee status determination will receive much more academic scrutiny in 
the future. Therefore, I wish to finish off my introductory remarks with a quote much 
used by the late Lord Bingham: 
 
“I have stirred these points, which wiser heads in time may settle.”1 
                                                
1 Holt C.J., cited in T. Bingham (1985) ‘The Judge as Juror: The Judicial Determination of Factual 
Issues,’ Current Legal Problems 38, p. 24. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The international community has agreed on the need for a system that offers 
protection to persons that are at risk of persecution in their countries of origin. In our 
world of Westphalian nation-states, people cannot move freely across borders and 
between countries; thus, it is not a given that victims of persecution can flee from 
their aggressors. This is why refugee law, and the international protection offered by 
that framework, is needed. The possibility to gain asylum provides an invaluable 
lifeline for millions of people worldwide that fear persecution for the reasons 
specified in the Refugee Convention.2 It is the responsibility of all contracting parties3 
to ensure that the Convention is implemented in a way that will grant protection to 
such persons. This, however, is not a straightforward task. The path between the legal 
definition of refugeehood and the actual recognition of such protection passes through 
the refugee status determination process, wherein the evidentiary difficulties that so 
often haunt claims for asylum render a proper application of the Refugee Convention 
extremely complex. According to Hathaway, a leading authority on refugee law, 
“[r]efugee status determination is among the most difficult forms of adjudication, 
involving as it does fact-finding in regard to foreign conditions, cross-cultural and 
interpreted examination of witnesses, [and] ever-present evidentiary voids.”4  
 
Subject to a few exceptions,5 a refugee in the legal sense of the word is a person who 
“owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country.”6 In practice, however, most claims for 
asylum do not turn on the exact interpretation of these legal concepts.7 Rather, the 
decisive issue becomes whether or not the applicant convinces the decision-maker 
that the evidence she presents for her claim is credible: according to Kagan, the 
credibility assessment is often “the single most important step” in determining a 
claim.8 As it turns out, while the assessment of the credibility of the applicant and her 
testimony may be thought to constitute a rather trivial rule of procedural law, this 
detail ends up being the decisive factor in a majority of refugee status determinations 
worldwide. If the credibility of the applicant is not accepted, she will rarely succeed 
in satisfying the substantial criteria that make up refugee status. In practice, credibility 
                                                
2 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, referred to as the ‘Refugee Convention’ 
throughout this thesis. 
3 As of 22 May 2013, there were 145 contracting parties: 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V~2&chapter=5&T
emp=mtdsg2&lang=en, last accessed on 22 May 2013. 
4 J. Hathaway (1993) Rebuilding Trust – Report of the Review of Fundamental Justice in Information 
Gathering and Dissemination at the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, p. 6. 
5 Refugee Convention (1951), supra note 2, Article 1(D); 1(E) and 1(F). 
6 Refugee Convention (1951), ibid, Article 1(A)(2).  
7 See, for example, A. Macklin, ‘Truth or Consequence: Credibility Determinations in the Refugee 
Context,’ International Association of Refugee Law Judges: Ottawa, Canada, 14-16 October 1998, p. 
134. 
8 M. Kagan (2002) ‘Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility Assessment in Refugee 
Status Determination,’ Georgetown Immigration Law Journal, 17, p. 367. 
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has been amplified from an alleviating evidentiary rule to a decisive factor in 
determining asylum claims.9  
 
Each and every asylum applicant who is deemed not credible in her claim but who is 
genuinely at risk of being persecuted constitutes an immense failure for the asylum 
system. The potentially deadly consequences of an erroneous decision mean that no 
genuine refugee should fall through the asylum safety net because their stories are not 
accepted as evidence. Nonetheless, statistics indicate that lack of credibility is the 
foremost reason why asylum claims are rejected.10 All the more worrying, a 
substantial number of the asylum claims that are overturned on appeal find that the 
initial credibility assessment was flawed. As a case in point, a report by Amnesty 
International published in April 2013 found that 84 percent of its sample UK cases 
that were overturned on appeal indicated that the initial decision-maker had wrongly 
made a negative assessment of the applicant’s credibility.11 Considering this 
information alongside the 25 percent rate of overturn on appeal of initial decisions to 
refuse asylum,12 flawed credibility assessments are clearly a very important reason 
why asylum applicants are being rejected. This merits serious consideration and 
investigation; thus, it becomes critical to look at the bases for decision-makers’ 
rejections of credibility. In addition to being extremely important, assessing 
credibility is also exceptionally hard. According to Amnesty International, credibility 
assessments are inherently difficult because they require the decision-maker to break 
with her instinctive practice of assessing someone’s behaviour in relation to whether 
it fits her own expectations of what would be a ‘normal’ or ‘common sense’ response 
to a certain situation.13 On top of this, asylum decision-making is usually not bound 
by normal rules of evidence:14 compared to many other areas of adjudication, it is 
remarkably unregulated. Meanwhile, it is clear that reliable procedures are central to 
the practical enforcement of the protection offered by international refugee law. 
 
1.1 Research questions 
This thesis will problematise the credibility assessments that are routinely being made 
in refugee status determination processes. In particular, it will focus on the 
complications that arise out of the ipso facto cross-cultural setting that comes about 
when an applicant leaves her country of origin and claims asylum in a foreign state, 
where persons of a completely different background15 end up assessing the credibility 
of her testimony. The main question that this thesis will address is: what problems 
arise in assessing the credibility of asylum applicants in light of the cross-cultural 
setting of the refugee status determination? In order to provide answers to this, several 
other sub-questions will be addressed. While discussing the main research question, 
                                                
9 J. Sweeney (2009) ‘Credibility, Proof and Refugee Law,’ International Journal of Refugee Law 21:4, 
p. 719. 
10 For example, a survey by Kagan of rejections issued at UNHCR’s regional office in Cario during the 
spring of 2002 showed that 77 percent of rejections were attributed to “lack of credibility:” M. Kagan 
(2002), supra note 8, p. 369. 
11 Amnesty International, A question of credibility: Why so many initial asylum decisions are 
overturned on appeal in the UK, April 2013, p. 12. 
12 Amnesty International (2013), ibid, p. 4. 
13 Amnesty International (2013), ibid, p. 34. 
14 See, for example, the Australian Migration Act 1958 section 353(2)(a) and the Canadian Immigration 
and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, section 173(c). 
15 Of course, there are exceptional situations where the decision-maker in the country of arrival shares a 
cultural background with the applicant, but these are certainly very rare. 
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the thesis will simultaneously explore how credibility assessments are being 
conducted. Consequently, it becomes important to understand the basics of how 
credibility assessments are regulated in domestic legal frameworks, which is another 
sub-question that will be looked at. Having compared these frameworks to the 
problems that arise, the thesis will devote one chapter to analysing how these 
problems could be alleviated and will to that effect make recommendations for 
common international standards of assessing credibility. First of all, however, in order 
to demonstrate why the main question is an important one to ask in the context of 
refugee status determinations, the thesis will address what role credibility assessments 
play in such processes.  
 
1.1.1 Delimitations 
In the course of writing this thesis, certain delimitations have been called on. To begin 
with, only the credibility of the asylum applicant’s own testimony will be addressed, 
and not that of other possible witnesses or any documentary evidence that the 
applicant may be able to present. It will therefore not discuss assessments of medical 
reports, although the assessment of such reports is sometimes discussed together with 
the assessment of country of origin information. The latter is clearly of interest in the 
present thesis, given its importance in cross-cultural assessments of credibility. 
Overall, more attention will be paid to elements of credibility grounds that are unique 
to the international application of refugee law. This means that although memory 
effects will be discussed in chapter 5 and demeanour in chapter 7, they will not be 
afforded the degree of analysis that they perhaps deserve because they are not as such 
unique to the cross-cultural setting of the refugee status determination.16 Moreover, it 
should be mentioned that the thesis will not look at the particular situations of specific 
groups of asylum applicants, such as children or applicants of diminished mental 
capacity. Another delimitation worth mentioning is that the focus of this thesis is 
strictly on refugee law, at the expense of procedural law more generally and the law 
of evidence in particular. A deeper study and comparison of the approach to fact-
finding in refugee law as compared to other legal disciplines remains outside the 
scope of this study, although it is readily admitted that the analysis would have 
benefited greatly from this. Finally, this thesis will only look at credibility 
assessments in the context of refugee status determinations. Thus, it will not discuss 
credibility in relation to other forms of subsidiary protection which may in fact be 
granted when an applicant’s credibility is not wholly accepted and therefore she is not 
found eligible for refugee status, but her situation is nonetheless such that it merits 
some other form of leave to remain.  
 
1.2 Structure and methodology  
The structure of this thesis is designed to answer the main research question and the 
sub-questions in a way that is accessible and structured in a logical manner. Chapter 2 
will discuss the role of credibility as an alleviating evidentiary rule, by explaining 
how credibility relates to the burden of proof, the standard of proof, and the benefit of 
the doubt. Chapter 2 will also attempt to define ‘credibility’ for the purpose of this 
thesis. Chapter 3 will explore another function that credible testimony plays in 
meeting the legal criteria of the refugee definition. To this end, the chapter will 
                                                
16 This is not a clear-cut distinction: some aspects of demeanour are exaggerated in cross-cultural 
adjudication, and some other grounds of credibility discussed are also of relevance in the evaluation of 
credibility in domestic procedures – for example, the issue of late disclosure in cases pertaining to 
sexual abuse. 
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discuss subjective and objective approaches to ‘well-founded fear of being 
persecuted.’ Taken together, chapters 2 and 3 will thus cover the role that credibility 
assessments play in refugee status determination processes. Moving on, chapter 4 will 
look at domestic frameworks for credibility assessments, thereby addressing another 
sub-question. This is important in order to understand what rules domestic decision-
makers are guided by in conducting credibility assessments. In addition to surveying 
the domestic laws on credibility assessments more generally, chapter 4 will address 
three specific issues that will later prove to be of great importance for evaluating 
credibility. These include whether or not there is an obligation to confront applicants 
with negative credibility findings; what the role of partial non-credibility is; and what 
possibilities applicants have to appeal negative credibility findings. Thereafter, 
chapters 5, 6 and 7 will analyse the three main grounds of credibility assessments: 
internal consistency, external consistency, and plausibility. These are the thesis’s 
central chapters, and it is mainly here that the problems arising in cross-cultural 
asylum credibility assessments will be discussed and evaluated. Having examined the 
grounds for credibility assessments and the problems that they involve, chapter 8 will 
attempt to formulate some recommendations that could improve the accuracy of 
credibility assessments, paying special attention to the cross-cultural element of 
refugee status determinations. At that point, all the research questions set out above 
will have been addressed and chapter 9 will serve to summarise the findings that they 
have led to.  
 
In order to answer the research questions, this thesis will rely on a combination of 
asylum decisions, academic sources, reports produced by international organisations 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), domestic and international legislation, 
and domestic guidelines on credibility assessments. This thesis is solely based on 
written materials and no empirical studies have been undertaken. Given the 
magnitude of the topic of cross-cultural credibility assessments, there is surprisingly 
little academic coverage of it. The different grounds of credibility have been 
mentioned and briefly discussed by some legal scholars, but rarely analysed at length. 
Some aspects have received more attention, notably the distorting effect that human 
memory can have on the ability to present a consistent testimony. To the best 
knowledge of the author, the grounds of credibility assessment have not previously 
been coherently analysed from a legal perspective that puts specific focus on the 
cross-cultural element of the refugee status determination. Consequently, this thesis is 
based on a multitude of different sources drawn from a variety of academic 
disciplines. Most of them are written by legal scholars and take a predominately 
judicial perspective on the issue of credibility assessments. However, the thesis will 
also refer extensively to materials produced by trained psychologists, physicians, 
sociologists and social anthropologists. Given the cross-cultural focus of the thesis, 
the latter will receive special attention as experts of social structures and contexts in 
different societies from which legal processes dealing specifically with cross-cultural 
evaluation have much to learn. 
 
The thesis addresses the international refugee law framework, but since this is 
implemented through domestic processes materials from a variety of jurisdictions 
have been utilised. Further, the asylum decisions referred to are drawn from several 
different levels of decision-making: first-instance administrative decisions, appellate 
tribunal judgments, and even on occasion cases from higher courts decided on the 
basis of judicial review. Most asylum decision will be drawn from English-speaking 
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common law jurisdictions, primarily from the UK, the US, Canada and Australia. 
There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, UNHCR has favoured the common law 
approach to evidentiary concepts and has adopted it in its application of refugee law. 
Therefore common law and its evidentiary concepts can be said to be of greater 
relevance to international refugee law than its civil law equivalents. Secondly, the 
aforementioned countries are some of the main recipients of applications for 
asylum.17 Thirdly, in order to achieve a consistent and accurate interpretation the 
present author has chosen to restrict herself to materials written in English or 
Swedish, as opposed to relying on translations. This final point is also the reason why 
most domestically produced reports relied on in this thesis stem from English-
speaking countries.  
 
This thesis will refer to all asylum applicants as ‘applicants,’ no matter the particular 
term used in the country where the claim has been made and irrespective of the 
hierarchical level on which the case is being decided. Likewise, the term ‘decision-
maker’ will be used for all those deciding asylum claims, without regard to domestic 
terminology or distinction between administrative and judicial fora.  
 
1.2.1 Limitations 
The proposed methodology contains several limitations. First and foremost, an 
international survey of credibility assessments comes at a high cost. Refugee status 
determinations are extremely diverse: they vary between countries, but also between 
individual decision-makers. When asylum decisions from the whole world are the 
object of study, it is clear that many findings will not be of relevance to a majority of 
the refugee status determinations being made.18 A focused study would have had the 
advantage of producing more specific results that are highly relevant to the particular 
sample being studied. In spite of this limitation, the present thesis has chosen to focus 
on refugee law worldwide, since it ultimately aims to pronounce on the state of 
international refugee law rather than its implementation in any specific country. As 
will become clear in chapter 9, its recommendations will be for the common 
international framework. Some of these recommendations will not bring about a 
change in certain domestic jurisdictions because they may already be in place there, 
but this thesis argues that across the globe, credibility assessments should live up to 
these standards.  
 
Another important limitation concerns the asylum decisions under study. Most first-
instance decisions are not publically reported, but are only accessible through the 
applicant, her legal representative, or possibly the agency conducting the 
determinations. Many of the academic sources and NGO reports referred to in this 
thesis have been able to access and investigate such decisions, and this analysis will at 
times refer to first-instance decisions that have been published in this way. Often, it is 
only certain parts of the decisions that are included in these sources. Clearly, it is a 
limitation that these decisions are not accessible for independent verification in their 
entirety. This thesis thus relies on the integrity of the academic and non-academic 
sources here referred to, and has carefully selected materials from well-known and 
respected organisations and academics. Hopefully, these sources can be trusted to 
                                                
17 According to UNHCR, in 2012 the top five receiving countries of asylum claims were the US, 
Germany, France, Sweden, and the UK: UNHCR, Asylum Trends 2012: Levels and Trends in 
Industrialized Countries, 21 March 2013, p. 8.  
18 In 2012, 479,300 applications for asylum were submitted worldwide: UNHCR (2013), ibid, p. 7. 
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have produced accurate and fair reports of the refugee status determinations that they 
refer to, but it is recognised that this constitutes a limitation nonetheless.  
 
Finally, it should be emphasised that this thesis is problem-oriented: it focuses on 
asylum claims where the credibility assessments have not been conducted 
satisfactorily. Alas, it cannot be expected to provide a fair account of how most 
credibility assessments are conducted, for that is not its purpose. The author hopes 
and believes that most asylum decision-makers would not reach negative findings of 
credibility on the grounds that decision-makers in the examples below have done. The 
purpose of the thesis is however to demonstrate that these findings are possible to 
reach under the current structures for credibility assessments, and that some decision-
makers – even if they are only a minority – do reach them, on highly dubious 
grounds. Once again: it is not the intention of this thesis to condemn all decision-
makers in asylum processes worldwide, but this concern cannot preclude it from 
pointing out that asylum seekers are currently being rejected for reasons that hinder 
the correct application of the Refugee Convention and the protection offered by the 
institution of asylum. 
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2. The role of credibility as an 
alleviating evidentiary rule 
 
In the following chapter, the link between establishing the legal elements of the 
refugee definition and the credibility of the applicant’s testimony will be elaborated 
on. As was noted by the UK Immigration and Asylum Tribunal in Asuming, asylum 
cases differ from most other types of legal disputes in the seriousness of the 
consequences of an erroneous decision, in the focus of the decision on future events, 
and the inherent difficulties of obtaining objective evidence.19 Against this 
background, it is clear that the question of what evidentiary threshold must be reached 
in order to amount to a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ is “all-important.”20 In 
analysing this issue, UNHCR has favoured using the terms ‘standard of proof’ and 
‘burden of proof’, borrowed from the law of evidence of common law countries.21 For 
this reason the following analysis will also employ this terminology, but notes that 
most civil law systems take a different approach to analysing whether an applicant for 
refugee status has met the requisite standard.  
 
2.1 The burden of proof 
In order to meet the standard of proof for ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted,’ 
facts must be established which cumulatively meet the threshold set by this standard. 
Such facts are ascertained by adducing proof or evidence, which may be either oral or 
documentary. The duty to provide evidence in order to prove such facts is termed the 
‘burden of proof.’22 General principles of the law of evidence hold that the burden of 
proof lies on the person making an assertion: thus, in asylum claims, this burden falls 
on the applicant for refugee status,23 and the relevant facts of the case will have to be 
supplied in the first place by the applicant herself.24 This renders the testimony of the 
applicant extremely important to the assessment of the claim: indeed, Hathaway has 
held that the careful consideration of the applicant’s own evidence is the “heart of the 
refugee status determination process.”25 However, legal accommodations have been 
made for the particularities of the asylum claim with reference to the difficulty of 
obtaining objective evidence. While the burden of proof in principle lies with the 
applicant the decision-maker shares her burden of ascertaining the relevant facts, and 
in some cases the latter may even be compelled to use all the means at her disposal to 
produce the necessary evidence in support of the application.26 Even though UNHCR 
explains this duty as being achieved largely by the decision-maker being familiar with 
                                                
19 Asuming v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Appl. No. 11530; see also D. Jackson 
(1999) Immigration Law and Practice, 2nd edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell, p. 453. 
20 G. Clayton (2010) Immigration and Asylum Law, 4th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 
455. 
21 UNHCR, Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims, 16 December 1998, para. 3. 
22 UNHCR Note (1998), ibid, para. 5. 
23 UNHCR Note (1998), ibid, para. 6; UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining 
Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refuges, 
December 2011, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3, para.196. Note, however, that in cases of group 
determinations where prima facie evidence is presented the burden of proof shifts from the applicants 
to the opponent: G. Herlitz (1994) ‘The meaning of the term “prima facie,”’ Louisiana Law Review 
55:2, p. 397. 
24 UNHCR Handbook (2011), supra note 23, para. 195. 
25 J. Hathaway (1991) The Law of Refugee Status, Toronto: Butterworths, p. 83. 
26 UNHCR Handbook (2011), supra note 23, para. 196. 
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the objective situation in the country and by guiding the applicant in providing the 
relevant information,27 it is nevertheless an important adjustment and a principal 
recognition of the difficult situation faced by the asylum seeker in substantiating her 
claim for refugee status.  
 
2.2 The standard of proof 
Civil and criminal law cases commonly make use of two distinct standards of proof: 
while civil cases are to be proven “on a balance of probability”, criminal cases require 
proof of a higher calibre, namely “proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”28 Given the 
grave consequences of an erroneous asylum decision, together with the difficulties of 
obtaining evidence in support of a claim, it would be unjust to require the high 
evidentiary standard employed in criminal law to be met in refugee status 
determination proceedings. Whereas the gravest mistake in criminal proceedings 
would be to incriminate an innocent person, the gravest mistake in asylum cases 
would be to refuse the application of a person at risk of being persecuted, thus forcing 
her into the arms of her persecutors. Consequently, there is no need for decision-
makers to be assured beyond a reasonable doubt that they are making the right call 
when they are granting asylum, for the necessity to avoid the risk of a wrongful 
refusal greatly outweighs any potential societal costs of a wrongful grant of status. 
The opposite, however, would certainly result in applicants being denied and 
subsequently suffering great harm at the hands of their persecutors. Such 
considerations lie behind UNHCR’s clarification that the determination of refugee 
status does not purport to identify refugees as a matter of certainty, but as a matter of 
likelihood.29  
 
2.2.1 Explaining the standard of proof  
The determinative standard of proof in the refugee definition is ‘well-founded.’30 
Senior courts of common law countries have elaborated on the meaning of this phrase 
in order to guide the interpretation and application of the Refugee Convention. In 
Cardoza-Fonseca, the US Supreme Court held the applicable standard to be a 
“reasonable possibility” of persecution, with Steven J. explaining that “[t]here is 
simply no room in the […] definition for concluding that because an applicant only 
has a 10% chance of being shot, tortured, or otherwise persecuted, that he or she has 
no ‘well-founded fear’ of that ever happening.”31 In Sivakumaran, the UK House of 
Lords per Lord Keith held the standard of proof to be a “reasonable degree of 
likelihood that [the applicant] will be persecuted,”32 whereas Lord Goff articulated the 
applicable test to be whether a “real and substantial risk of persecution” actually 
exists.33 The standard set out in Sivakumaran still stands, but has since been 
simplified to a “real risk” test.34 Moreover, the Australian High Court has favoured a 
                                                
27 UNHCR Note (1998), supra note 21, para. 6. 
28 G. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam (2007) The Refugee in International Law, 3rd edition, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 54. 
29 UNHCR Note (1998), supra note 21, para. 2. 
30 S. Norman (2007) ‘Assessing the Credibility of Refugee Applicants: A Judicial Perspective’, 
International Journal of Refugee Law 19:2, p. 279.  
31 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987), para. 440. 
32 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Sivakumaran and Others [1988] A.C. 
958, p. 994 per Lord Keith. 
33 Ex parte Sivakumaran [1988], ibid, p. 1000 per Lord Goff. 
34 PS (Sri Lanka) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 1213, para. 11 per 
Sedley LJ. 
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standard of proof that assesses whether there is a “real chance” of persecution, since 
this test “conveys the notion of a substantial, as distinct from a remote chance, of 
persecution occurring,”35 and the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal has approved 
“good grounds for fearing persecution” as a description of the evidentiary standard.36 
The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
sets out the applicable test for ‘well-founded fear’ to be met if it can be established to 
a “reasonable degree” that the applicant’s continued stay in her country of origin has 
become intolerable for the reasons stated in the refugee definition.37 All these 
different formulations of the standard of proof clearly point in the same direction, 
namely that it must not be shown to be likely or probable that the applicant will be 
persecuted if returned: instead, decision-makers are to assess whether there is a 
“possibility,” a “risk” or a “chance” of such persecution occurring. Accordingly, the 
applicable standard of proof is quite low: it is in fact even lower than the civil law 
standard of a “balance of probability.” The standard of proof in refugee status 
determinations holds that an applicant can be recognised as a refugee even when there 
is only a small “possibility,”  “risk” or “chance” that she will be persecuted, as long as 
this risk is “real” or “reasonable.” In Kaja, it was held by the UK Asylum and 
Immigration Tribunal that this standard of proof applies to the evaluation of evidence, 
too,38 thus enabling evidence of uncertain truth to be put on the scales towards 
meeting the overall standard of proof for ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted.’39 
This was approved by the British Court of Appeal in Karanakaran, which clarified 
that past events and future risk are both to be proven on a “reasonable degree of 
likelihood” rather than on the balance of probabilities, because they are part of a 
single composite test.40 It is also to be noted that the standard of proof can be met by 
an aggregate of evidence. According to the Handbook the cumulative effect of the 
applicant’s experience must be taken into account, and although no single incident 
may be sufficient to meet the applicable standard, taken together all the incidents 
described by the applicant may render her fear ‘well-founded.’41  
 
2.2.2 The role of past persecution in meeting the standard of proof 
The applicable standard of proof flows from the nature of the plea: for asylum claims, 
this constitutes an assessment of the risk of persecution based on the establishment of 
facts and the applicant’s state of mind, rather than being based solely on such facts 
and mindsets.42 It is future risk that is central to whether a ‘well-founded fear of being 
persecuted’ exists: past persecution is in no sense a condition for refugee status.43 But 
in determining whether the standard of proof for future risk has been met, past 
persecution is often invoked as evidence. The weight to be given to such proof in 
building towards the applicable standard is not entirely clear. According to Grahl-
Madsen, past persecution is to be considered a presumption for the likelihood of 
                                                
35 Chan v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62, 12 September 1989, para. 12 
per Mason CJ. 
36 Adjedi v. Minister for Employment and Immigration [1989] 2 FC 680, per MacGuian J. 
37 UNHCR Handbook  (2011), supra note 23, para. 42. 
38 Koyazia Kaja v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, HX/7-673/93 (11038), United 
Kingdom: Asylum and Immigration Tribunal / Immigration Appellate Authority, 10 June 1994. 
39 D. Jackson (1999), supra note 19, p. 449. 
40 Karanakaran v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 11, 25 January 
2000. 
41 UNHCR Handbook (2011), supra note 23, para. 201. 
42 D. Jackson (1999), supra note 19, p. 449. 
43 J. Hathaway (1991), supra note 25, p. 87. 
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future persecution, constituting prima facie proof to the effect that the applicant may 
again become a victim of persecution should she return to her home country.44 But 
this arguably grants too much importance to past persecution as part of refugee 
recognition, for if that presumption is not rebutted it would result in refugee status 
being bestowed for reasons of past persecution, which is not what the Refugee 
Convention is concerned with. There cannot be such a presumption, for the existence 
of “historic fear” is not sufficient in itself.45 Even if past persecution does not give 
rise to a presumption of future persecution, however, it may nonetheless constitute 
important evidence to justify a claim of current well-founded fear:46 it may even be 
said to lend “considerable force” to a submission of fear in the future.47 The EU’s 
Qualifications Directive, which applies to all EU Member States in their 
implementation of the Refugee Convention, holds that past persecution “is a serious 
indication of the applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution…unless there are good 
reasons to consider that such persecution […] will not be repeated.”48 On the same 
note, UNHCR has stated that past persecution or mistreatment weighs “heavily” in 
favour of a positive finding of future risk, but simultaneously points out that its 
absence is not a decisive factor, either.49  
 
In sum, the applicant for refugee status can satisfy the ‘well-founded fear of being 
persecuted’ criterion by meeting the applicable standard of proof, usually by showing 
that there is a  “real risk” or a “reasonable possibility” that she will be persecuted. 
Past persecution is often invoked as evidence of a future risk, and although such proof 
constitutes a “serious indication” of future risk it is not of itself sufficient, nor is it 
necessary. Due to the particular circumstances of the asylum case the testimony of the 
applicant usually amounts to the bulk of her evidence, both with regard to describing 
past persecution and reasons for future risk. It is this evidence that lies at heart of her 
effort to meet the applicable standard of proof. If her testimony is not deemed 
credible, however, it will not be admissible as evidence building towards the 
threshold for a ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted.’50 Credibility assessments are 
thus of central importance to the applicant’s ability to meet the standard of proof. 
 
2.3 The benefit of the doubt and the credibility of the applicant 
Although UNHCR contends that the burden of proof is shared between the applicant 
and the decision-maker, in practice it often rests firmly with the applicant. Yet, given 
the nature of the asylum seeker’s situation, it is hardly possible for her to prove every 
part of her case: “if this were a requirement the majority of refugees would not be 
recognised.”51 For this reason, it is often necessary to give the applicant the benefit of 
the doubt.52 In the context of the standard of proof this term is used for the factual 
                                                
44 A. Grahl-Madsen (1966) The Status of Refugees in International Law: Volume I – Refugee 
Character, Leiden: Sijthoff, p. 176. 
45 R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Adan, CO/872/98, House of Lords 
(Judicial Committee), 2 April 1998, per Lord Slynn. 
46 Ex parte Adan [1998], ibid, per Lord Slynn. 
47 D. Jackson (1999), supra note 19, p. 448. 
48 Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals 
or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the 
content of the protection granted, 2004/83/EC, Article 4(4). 
49 UNHCR Note (1998), supra note 21, para. 19. 
50 J. Sweeney (2009), supra note 9, p. 713. 
51 UNHCR Handbook  (2011), supra note 23, para. 203. 
52 UNHCR Handbook  (2011), ibid. 
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assertions made by the applicant: given that the standard of proof does not require the 
decision-maker to be fully convinced that all factual assertions are true, the benefit of 
the doubt is triggered where the decision-maker considers that the applicant’s story on 
the whole is coherent and plausible53 – in other words, credible. This means that any 
element of doubt should not prejudice the applicant’s claim.54 Instead, focus is shifted 
away from the details to the overall impression made by the evidence presented by the 
applicant. The benefit of the doubt is not freely granted to all applicants: the 
Handbook holds that it should only be given when all available evidence has been 
obtained and checked, and when the decision-maker is satisfied as to the applicant’s 
general credibility.55 In this way, the notion of credibility “works together with the 
benefit of the doubt to compensate for the evidential difficulties faced by asylum 
seekers.”56 
 
As has been explained throughout this chapter, credibility is central to the refugee 
status determination process because it is necessary in order to render the applicant’s 
testimony admissible as evidence, and because a positive credibility finding will grant 
the applicant the benefit of the doubt with regard to facts which she cannot 
conclusively prove. Since the burden of proof rests mainly upon the applicant, she 
will need to adduce the required evidence to meet the standard of proof for a ‘well-
founded fear of being persecuted,’ and since it is generally very hard to obtain 
objective evidence that demonstrates this future risk, the testimony of the applicant is 
vital. When credibility is asserted, the benefit of the doubt comes into play and can 
assist the applicant in establishing her claim to the applicable standard of proof. 
According to UNHCR, credibility is established “where the applicant has presented a 
claim which is coherent and plausible, not contradicting generally known facts, and 
therefore is, on balance, capable of being believed.”57 This formulation implies that 
there are three separate aspects of credibility, namely coherence, plausibility, and 
non-contradiction of generally known facts. Weston has suggested a similar division 
of the concept in her analysis of UK decision-makers’ practice: she proposes that 
credibility assessments involve checking for internal consistency, external 
consistency, and plausibility.58 While Weston’s dissection of the credibility concept 
clearly draws on and covers the aspects mentioned by UNHCR, it is even more 
precise in its terminology and provides an excellent starting point for analysis. For 
this reason, the remainder of this thesis will discuss the role of credibility assessments 
in the refugee status determination process according to Weston’s division of the 
concept. 
 
2.3.1 Credibility, proof and truth 
It is important to clarify that the term ‘credibility’ is being used in at least two distinct 
ways within the refugee status determination process, but only one of them is relevant 
for this thesis. Kagan has observed that even UNHCR itself confuses these separate 
usages.59 The ‘broad’ interpretation of ‘credibility’ asks whether the applicant has a 
                                                
53 UNHCR Note (1998), supra note 21, para. 12. 
54 UNHCR Note (1998), ibid. 
55 UNHCR Handbook (2011), supra note 23, para. 204.  
56 J. Sweeney (2009), supra note 9, p. 726. 
57 UNHCR Note (1998), supra note 21, para. 11; see also UNHCR Handbook (2011), supra note 23, 
para. 204. 
58 A. Weston (1998) ‘”A witness of truth” – credibility findings in asylum appeals,’ Immigration and 
Nationality Law and Practice 12, p. 88. 
59 M. Kagan (2002), supra note 8, p. 369. 
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‘credible well-founded fear’ or a ‘credible claim,’60 thus referring to whether the 
application is meritorious and successful as a whole. According to this understanding, 
describing a claim as ‘credible’ is to say that the applicant’s statements are true.61 The 
term ‘credibility’ has been used by UNHCR in this sense when referring to the 
‘overall credibility’ of a claim.62 By contrast, the ‘narrow’ approach refers to the 
assessment of an applicant’s testimony.63 This understanding sees credibility more as 
a pre-requisite evidential step: a ‘credible’ statement “is one that is not certainly true, 
not yet proven but, because it is plausible, consistent, and reflects generally known 
facts, must not be dismissed from the consideration of whether the applicant has a 
well-founded fear of persecution [sic].”64 It is this understanding that UNHCR is 
promoting when the Handbook talks about giving the benefit of the doubt,65 and this 
understanding clearly sees credibility as an alternative, rather than a synonym, to 
proof.66 It is this more narrow understanding of the term that will be employed 
throughout this thesis, and numerous leading academics on this area of refugee law 
have also proclaimed in favour of this view.67 Thus, assessing ‘credibility’ for the 
purpose of this thesis means assessing whether or not the applicant’s testimony is 
accepted as evidence building towards the applicable standard of proof for being 
recognised as a refugee, possibly working together with the benefit of the doubt. 
‘Being credible’ is thus not the same as ‘being proven’ or ‘being true.’68 When a 
decision-maker holds that an applicant is credible, this is not the same as saying that 
she holds the applicant’s statements to be true. It is sufficient that the testimony is 
“capable of being believed,”69 and not necessary that the decision-maker herself 
actually believes the applicant.70 Writing from her experiences as an immigration 
judge, Macklin suggests that credibility determinations are not about ‘discovering’ 
truth, but rather about making choices about what to accept and what to reject in the 
face of evidential uncertainty.71 Norman, another immigration judge, has likewise 
concluded that credibility assessments are not principally about assessing the truth of 
an applicant’s claims, but about making findings of fact that are reasonable and open 
on the evidence.72 In the end, findings of credibility are subjective assessments – be it 
as it may that they are at the very core of meeting the standard of proof to establishing 
a well-founded fear of being persecuted. They are not objective truths and should 
never be treated as such. However, the fact that credibility assessments are ultimately 
subjective does not mean that they may be conducted in any manner that the decision-
maker sees fit. This chapter has demonstrated the central role that credibility 
assessments play as an alleviating evidentiary rule in refugee status determinations, 
and it is clear that an applicant’s credibility is too precious to be dismissed on 
anything less than well-reasoned grounds.   
                                                
60 M. Kagan (2002), ibid. 
61 J. Sweeney (2009), supra note 9, p. 708. 
62 UNHCR Note (1998), supra note 21, para. 11. 
63 M. Kagan (2002), supra note 8, p. 369. 
64 J. Sweeney (2009), supra note 9, p. 708. 
65 UNHCR Handbook (2011), supra note 23, para. 196. 
66 J. Sweeney (2009), supra note 9, p. 711. 
67 M. Kagan (2002), supra note 8, p. 370; J. Sweeney (2009), supra note 9, p. 708. 
68 J. Sweeeny (2009), ibid, p. 711. 
69 UNHCR Note (1998), supra note 21, para. 11. 
70 M. Kagan (2002), supra note 8, p. 381. 
71 A. Macklin (1998), supra note 7, p. 140. 
72 S. Norman (2007), supra note 30, p. 291. 
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3. The role of credibility in 
demonstrating a ‘well-founded fear 
of being persecuted’ 
 
In addition to its role as an alleviating evidentiary rule, this thesis argues that 
credibility also plays another important part in the refugee status determination. This 
is concerned with the contents of the legal definition of refugeehood itself, more 
precisely with the applicant demonstrating that she has a ‘well-founded fear of being 
persecuted.’ According to the UNHCR Handbook, this phrase is “the key phrase of 
the [refugee] definition.”73 In spite of its significance to the determination of refugee 
status, the interpretation of ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ has been fraught 
with controversy. The main debate concerns whether the phrase implicates a 
subjective element into the refugee definition, or whether it is to be assessed 
according to purely objective standards. According to Noll, this debate is essentially a 
procedural one, with significant repercussions on evidentiary assessment.74 This 
chapter will explore these differing views, starting with the ‘combined’ approach 
followed by the ‘objective’ standpoint. It will conclude that both these different 
perspectives put great emphasis on credible testimony in order to establish a ‘well-
founded fear of being persecuted,’ since testimony from the applicant herself is 
usually the only type of evidence that can satisfy the legal standard.  
 
3.1 The ‘combined’ approach 
The dominant view worldwide is that ‘well-founded fear’ comprises two essential 
elements, one subjective and one objective.75 Its hegemony over the purely ‘objective’ 
approach has been favoured by some academics, by most domestic courts, and by 
UNHCR.76 This proliferation means that it has taken on multiple forms in practice, of 
which only a few will be discussed here.  
 
One of the most authoritative and widely cited sources on this subject, the UNHCR 
Handbook, has explicitly recognised a subjective element based on the subjectivity of 
‘fear’.77 What is more, the Handbook seems to give precedence to this subjective 
component over its objective counterpart by holding that “[d]etermination of refugee 
status will […] primarily require an evaluation of the applicant’s statements rather 
than a judgment on the situation prevailing in his country of origin.”78 It goes on to 
explain ‘well-founded’ as implying that the applicant’s frame of mind must be 
“supported” by an objective situation79 – again, the choice of words suggests a strong 
                                                
73 UNHCR Handbook (2011), supra note 23, para. 37. 
74 G. Noll (2005) ‘Evidentiary Assessment under the Refugee Convention: Risk, Pain and the 
Intersubjectivity of Fear’, in Proof, Evidentiary Assesssment and Credibility in Asylum Procedures 
(Noll, G. ed.), Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, p. 141. 
75 J. Hathaway and W. Hicks (2004) ‘Is There A Subjective Element in the Refugee Convention’s 
Requirement of Well-Founded Fear?’ Michigan Journal of International Law 26:2, p. 510. 
76 A. Zimmermann (2011) The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 338. 
77 “Since fear is subjective, the definition involves a subjective element in the person applying for 
recognition as a refugee” – UNHCR Handbook (2011), supra note 23, para. 37. 
78 UNHCR Handbook (2011), ibid. 
79 UNHCR Handbook (2011), ibid, para. 38. 
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preference for the subjective aspect of refugee status determination. But what kind of 
subjective assessment is being alluded to? The answer is perhaps to be found in the 
paragraph which holds that an evaluation of the subjective element is inseparable 
from an assessment of the personality of the applicant “since psychological reactions 
of different individuals may not be the same in identical situations. One person may 
have strong political or religious convictions, the disregard of which would make his 
life intolerable; another may have no such strong convictions.”80 It would seem that 
the Handbook’s test requires proof of the characteristics which make the individual 
fear persecution, rather than proof of trepidation as such. But, as will become clear 
from the next section, this interpretation is not shared by all.  
 
Given that UNHCR is the guardian of the Refugee Convention, its opinions on the 
interpretation of the instrument should presumably carry considerable weight. But 
there is little legal basis for such an inference: according to Goodwin-Gill, the 
Handbook does not clearly fall within the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ 
frame of reference as a source of treaty interpretation.81 Even so, domestic superior 
courts have often supported its positions82 – according to Lord Woolf MR the 
Handbook is particularly helpful as a guide to the Convention since there is no 
international court to interpret it,83 implying a very high regard for its guidance. As 
already mentioned, the ‘combined’ approach has been endorsed in several leading 
domestic cases. In Cardoza-Fonseca, the US Supreme Court per Blackmun J. held 
that “the very language of the term ‘well-founded fear’ demands a particular type of 
analysis – an examination of the subjective feelings of an applicant for asylum 
coupled with an inquiry into the objective nature of the articulated reasons for the 
fear.”84 Furthermore, in Ward the Supreme Court of Canada identified a bipartite test 
for fear of persecution, holding that “(1) the claimant must subjectively fear 
persecution, and (2) this fear must be well-founded in an objective sense.”85 The 
Australian High Court per Dawson J, for its part, held in Chan that ‘well-founded fear 
of being persecuted’ contains both a state of mind amounting to fear of being 
persecuted and a well-founded basis for that fear, motivating the objective element by 
holding that “[i]t is clear enough that the object of the Convention is not to relieve 
fears which are all in the mind, however understandable, but to facilitate refuge for 
those who are in need of it.”86 In the same case, Toohey J. elaborated on his 
interpretation as to why the test is a combined one: “[i]f the test were entirely 
subjective, the expression “well-founded” would serve no useful purpose. On the 
other hand, it is fear of persecution of which Art. 1A(2) speaks, not the fact of 
persecution. So it is apparent that while the requirement is not entirely subjective, it is 
not entirely objective either. Both elements are present.”87  
 
In addition to leading common law precedents, many noted academics have favoured 
the ‘combined’ approach. For example, Weis has asserted that asylum applicants “will 
                                                
80 UNHCR Handbook (2011), ibid, para. 40. 
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86 Chan [1989], supra note 35, para. 16 per Dawson J. 
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have to give such indications as will enable the determining authority to decide 
whether she has good reasons to fear persecution” and to that end “the circumstances 
and the background of the person, his psychological attitude and sensitivity towards 
his environment play a role as well as the objective facts – what may be regarded as 
‘good reasons’ in one case may not be ‘good reasons’ in another.”88 Weis’ 
understanding of the subjective element seems to be that the applicant needs to show 
the decision-maker why she, in her particular circumstances, has fear – not that she 
necessarily has to demonstrate fear in the sense of trepidation. Melander has also 
argued for a ‘combined’ approach to ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ by 
holding the subjective element to mean “that the fear must be well-founded in the 
sense of not being feigned or imaginary,” as well as being sincere and reasonable.89 
To require fear to be reasonable, and not imagined, also points to that it should be 
based on the objective circumstances of the applicant, rather than on her emotions and 
dispositions. This, too, implies that the fear is to have its basis in the particular 
circumstances of the applicant, but without requiring subjective trepidation. 
 
3.2 The ‘objective’ approach 
Notwithstanding the ample support for the ‘combined’ approach elaborated on in the 
previous section, some leading refugee law scholars have argued that reference to 
distinct ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ elements of the well-founded fear standard risks 
distorting the refugee status determination process.90 Instead, they believe that ‘fear’ 
in the context of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention should be understood as 
“a forward-looking expectation of risk,”91 the well-foundedness of which is purely 
evidentiary in nature.92 From this viewpoint it remains legally immaterial whether or 
not a person is subjectively fearful.93 Although support for the ‘objective’ approach 
has proliferated over the last two decades or so, it was implicitly advanced already in 
the 1960s by Grahl-Madsen who argued that the adjective ‘well-founded’ suggests 
that it is not the frame of mind of the applicant which is decisive, but that the claim 
“should be measured with a more objective yardstick.”94 According to Grahl-Madsen, 
every person claiming to be a refugee has ‘fear’ of being persecuted, irrespective of 
the expression that this fear may take.95 Consequently, ‘fear’ hardly matters at all for 
the purpose of refugee status determination. In more recent academic commentary, 
the ‘objective’ approach has been most fiercely advanced by Hathaway, and it is 
regularly implemented by New Zealand courts.96  
 
Proponents of the ‘objective’ approach have advanced a number of criticisms towards 
the ‘combined’ approach. First and foremost, they have argued that inclusion of a 
subjective element results in differential protection being granted by the refugee 
definition. According to Hathaway and Hicks, the ‘combined’ approach can lead to 
denial of refugee status to at-risk applicants who are not fearful, or whose trepidation 
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is not detected by the decision-maker.97 Since the ‘combined’ approach posits both 
the subjective and the objective elements as crucial to refugee recognition, failure to 
establish subjective fear necessarily leads to status being denied.98 Another criticism 
which has been advanced refers to the narrow linguistic interpretation of ‘fear’ which 
the ‘combined’ approach often leans on. Hathaway argues that ‘fear’ may either imply 
a form of emotional response or an anticipatory appraisal of risk, and that in the 
context of the Refugee Convention the term denotes the latter.99 This interpretation 
better accords with the equally authoritative French version of the text and the 
meaning that Francophone courts have attached to it.100 Moreover, internal 
consistency of the Refugee Convention also supports a forward-looking interpretation 
of ‘fear’ since the prohibition of refoulement found in Article 33 aims to ensure that 
refugees are not exposed to actual risk of harm.101  
 
Even though Hathaway and his academic following vigorously resist admitting to a 
subjective element as part of the ‘well-founded fear’ criterion, they implicitly 
recognise a subjective aspect of ‘being persecuted.’ The Michigan Guidelines on 
Well-Founded Fear explain that the determination of whether a given risk amounts to 
a risk of ‘being persecuted’ must look at the personal circumstances and 
characteristics of the applicant, recognising that “some persons will experience 
different degrees of harm as a result of a common threat or action.”102 Hathaway and 
Hicks justify this view by reference to international human rights law, which shows 
that certain characteristics of an individual can affect the question of whether her 
human rights are violated.103 They also note that the duty to consider “particularised” 
impact in assessing refugee status is anchored in the language of the refugee 
definition which speaks of ‘being persecuted’ in the passive voice,104 thus conveying 
“concern both with the conduct of the persecutor and the effect that conduct has on 
the person being persecuted.”105 This is clearly a form of subjective element, and 
since the ‘risk’ element is derived from ‘fear’ in the ‘objective’ approach, it would 
seem that this analysis is not so far from the ‘combined’ approach, after all. 
Nevertheless, the ‘objective’ approach regards it as a separate evaluation from that of 
the well-foundedness of fear. In the view of the present author, at least part of the 
discrepancy between the two main views lies precisely here: while some 
commentators analyse ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ as an integral 
concept,106 others divide the same phrase into two separate tests that must both be 
satisfied in order for an applicant to be granted asylum.107  
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3.3 Implications for the role of credibility 
According to Noll, credibility108 can relate to two objects of belief: either belief in the 
applicant’s fear, or belief in the well-foundedness of that fear.109 Noll’s analysis holds 
that it is belief in the well-foundedness of fear that is central to the refugee status 
determination, but that it is confusing to call this credibility assessment because a 
finding of non-credibility essentially means that there is too little information for the 
decision-maker to settle the claim and that the search for evidence must go on.110 
Considering credibility as belief in the well-foundedness of fear seems closely related 
to the view which this chapter has described as the ‘objective’ approach, since it holds 
that it is not necessary for the applicant to prove a subjective fear element; the only 
thing to be settled in the asylum process is whether there exists an objective risk that 
the applicant will be persecuted. Consequently, decision-makers adopting the 
‘objective’ approach have held that even if the applicant is not deemed credible in her 
testimony, a well-founded fear of being persecuted may nevertheless exists and it 
must be considered whether any other basis asserted leads to this conclusion.111 
Potential problems arise, however, when we consider that even proponents of the 
‘objective’ approach believe that what amounts to ‘being persecuted’ depends on the 
personal circumstances of the applicant. If the testimony of the applicant is not 
accepted as credible, it is hard to imagine how it can be established that she is at risk 
of experiencing a degree of harm that will amount to ‘being persecuted.’ Perhaps 
there are cases where the risk that the applicant is facing can objectively be deemed to 
be so grave that it undoubtedly amounts to persecution, but in many instances it will 
not be crystal-clear that a certain risk reaches that threshold. Thus, in those cases, 
even the ‘objective’ approach would require credible testimony from the applicant in 
order to satisfy all the criteria that the refugee definition entails.  
 
A strict reading of the ‘combined’ approach, for its part, holds that when an applicant 
is found to be lacking in credibility, the decision-maker can legitimately find that 
there is no subjective basis for the claim. In such cases, it is practically impossible to 
find credible evidence of an applicant’s subjective fear, notwithstanding external 
evidence of human rights violations in her country of origin, and thus the application 
must fail.112 This is the dominant view in Canada, for example: the Credibility 
Guidelines issued by the Immigration and Refugee Board assert that following Ward, 
it is clear that “a lack of evidence going to the subjective element of the claim is in 
itself sufficient for the claim to fail.”113 Further, when deciding Ramsameachire in the 
US Court of Appeals Sotomayor J. held that “the [Board of Immigration Appeals’] 
adverse credibility determination precluded [the applicant] from establishing the 
subjective prong of the well-founded fear standard.”114 Thus, this thesis argues that 
credibility assessments are central to almost all refugee status determinations, 
irrespective of whether the decision-maker adopts a ‘combined’ or an ‘objective’ 
approach to ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted,’ for a kind of subjective 
                                                
108 Here understood as the subjective capacity to inspire belief: G. Noll (2005), supra note 75, p. 149. 
109 G. Noll (2005), ibid. 
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Protection, 31 January 2004, p. 16 
113 Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (2004), ibid, p. 17. 
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evaluation is included in both. Certain elements of the refugee definition cannot be 
satisfied without establishing the effect that the risk of persecution has on the 
applicant, or on what amounts to persecution, respectively. Only the testimony from 
the applicant herself can demonstrate these circumstances, and such testimony will 
only be admissible as evidence if it is deemed credible by the decision-maker. 
Consequently, this chapter holds that credibility is important not only to bestow upon 
the applicant the benefit of the doubt, but also to enable her to produce the kind of 
evidence that is capable of demonstrating that she has a ‘well-founded fear of being 
persecuted.’ In short, it is highly unlikely that a claim for asylum will succeed in 
meeting the legal criteria set down in the Refugee Convention if the applicant is not 
found to be credible. Having demonstrated the central role that credibility assessments 
play in refugee status determination processes, the remainder of this thesis will 
explore how such evaluations are regulated on the domestic level, and how they are 
conducted in practice.  
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4. Domestic frameworks for 
credibility assessments 
 
Before we embark on the main issue of this thesis – the ways in which negative 
credibility assessments are reached by decision-makers – this chapter will serve to 
provide a rough sketch of some of the domestic legislative frameworks within which 
such assessments are being made. Having already explained UNHCR’s approach to 
applicants’ credibility, it is further necessary to look at the domestic laws in place, 
since most refugee status determinations are conducted within domestic legal 
frameworks.115 As will soon become clear, there is little domestic legislative guidance 
for credibility assessments. Asylum decisions are often not bound by normal rules of 
evidence,116 and fact-finding is generally considered as a sphere in which the 
legislator should not interfere too much.  
 
This chapter will explore the domestic laws governing credibility assessments, and in 
so doing it will put particular focus on whether decision-makers are obliged to 
confront applicants with negative credibility findings and what the effect of partial 
credibility findings is. In addition, it will investigate the possibilities to appeal 
negative credibility findings. These issues are all of great importance in order to 
understand how credibility assessments are conducted, how findings are evaluated, 
and the consequences that they have. The chapter will draw on the domestic laws of 
the US, the UK, Canada, Australia, and Sweden. Since most of the case law referred 
to in this thesis originates from these jurisdictions, it is useful to have a grasp of the 
domestic frameworks pertaining to findings of credibility. It remains outside the 
scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive picture of all aspects of credibility 
assessments in all the above-mentioned countries; rather, the following descriptions 
will serve to paint a picture of the frameworks that domestic credibility assessments 
are conducted within. 
 
4.1 Domestic laws governing the performance of credibility 
assessments 
Following the enactment of the REAL ID Act of 2005, asylum decision-makers in the 
US are bound to comply with one of the most detailed statutory exposés of how 
credibility assessments should be conducted. The REAL ID Act stipulates that a trier 
of fact  
 
…may base a credibility determination on the demeanour, candour, or 
receptiveness of the applicant or witness, the inherent plausibility of the 
applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the applicant’s or 
witness’s written and oral statements […] the internal consistency of each 
such statement, the consistency of such statements with other evidence on 
record […] and any inconsistencies or falsehoods in such statements […] or 
any other relevant factor.117  
                                                
115 In 2005, UNHCR processed 14 percent of all asylum applications: UNHCR, Measuring Protection 
by Numbers (2005), November 2006, p. 13. 
116 See, for example, the Australian Migration Act, supra note 14, section 420(2)(a) and the Canadian 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, supra note 14, section 170. 
117 8 U.S.C. § 1158(6)(1)(B)(iii). 
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Thus, the REAL ID Act explicitly endorses credibility findings based on demeanour, 
plausibility, internal consistency and external consistency. By including “any other 
relevant factor,” the provision also grants a wide discretion to the decision-maker with 
regard to what she may base her credibility determination upon. Melloy has argued 
that even though the REAL ID Act attempts to create uniform credibility standards, it 
may have the opposite effect: “it will give immigration judges the ability to make 
subjective, capricious determinations about the credibility of asylum applicants.”118 
 
Other common law jurisdictions have instead codified negative aspects of credibility 
findings. The Australian Migration Act of 1958 provides that if the decision-maker 
has reason to believe that the applicant was not sincere in the information she has 
given because of the manner in which she gave the oral statement or the applicant’s 
demeanour in relation to giving the statement, the decision-maker may draw any 
reasonable inference unfavourable to the applicant’s credibility.119 In most other 
ways, however, considerable discretion is left to Australian decision-makers and they 
are not under an enforceable duty to evaluate credibility evidence in any way other 
than how they believe the object of arriving at the correct decision will be 
furthered.120 UK law, for its part, has long contained provisions tending towards the 
negative assessment of credibility.121 The Immigration Rules122 are administrative 
rules which apply to first-instance decision-makers of the Home Office. One such rule 
stipulates that the decision-maker will have regard to matters which may damage an 
applicant’s credibility if no reasonable explanation is given. Among such matters are 
that the applicant has failed to apply for asylum forthwith upon arrival in the UK; that 
the applicant has made false representations; that the applicant has destroyed or 
damaged her passport; and that the applicant has launched concurrent applications for 
asylum. If the decision-maker concludes “for these or any other reasons” that an 
applicant’s account is not credible, “the application will be refused.”123 Tuitt has 
commented that the “any other reasons” provision robs the procedure of any serious 
cohesion, and ensures that there is a residuary power of the decision-maker to make 
adverse credibility findings in a “secretive manner” which belies the supposed 
openness of harmonised procedures124 – this criticism is very similar to that presented 
by Melloy with regard to the REAL ID Act. Furthermore, section 8 of the Asylum and 
Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act of 2004 states that decision-makers 
“shall take account, as damaging the claimant’s credibility” of a variety of different 
behaviours, including failure without reasonable explanation to produce a passport on 
request; failure to take advantage of a reasonable opportunity to make an asylum 
claim while in a safe country; and failure to make an asylum claim before being 
notified of an immigration decision.125 Following its status as primary legislation, the 
Act applies to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal as well as to the initial decision-
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maker. This provision has been criticised: Thomas has accused it of constituting the 
“culmination of legislative pressure on the independent appeal system to reach 
negative credibility assessments;”126 and the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal has 
held that it has the effect of “interfering [sic] the well-established rule that the finder 
of fact […] should look at the evidence as a whole, giving each item of it such weight 
as he or she considers appropriate.”127 In JT (Cameroon), the Court of Appeal per Pill 
LJ recognised that section 8 “plainly has its dangers, first, if it is read as a direction as 
to how fact-finding should be conducted, which in my judgment it is not, and, in any 
event, in distorting the fact-finding exercise by an undue concentration on minutiae 
which may arise under the section at the expense of, and as a distraction from, an 
overall assessment.”128 Instead, Pill LJ suggested that section 8 should be interpreted 
as “potentially” damaging the applicant’s credibility, without dictating that relevant 
damage to credibility inevitably results129 – this would offend against constitutional 
principles such as the separation of powers between the judiciary and the legislature. 
 
Considering the sensitivity of legislating on factual interpretation encountered in 
many countries, it is perhaps not surprising that Canadian assessments of credibility 
are wholly guided by provisions and principles found in the jurisprudence.130 One of 
the interesting particularities of the Canadian framework is the presumption of 
truthfulness that arises when an applicant swears that certain facts are true, unless 
there is valid reason to doubt their truthfulness.131 The presumption may be refuted by 
the presence of inconsistencies and contradictions, implausibility and where facts as 
presented are not what could reasonably be expected.132 Further, adverse findings of 
credibility must be based on reasonably drawn inferences and not conjecture or mere 
speculation.133 Likewise, Sweden has also refrained from legislating on more detailed 
guidance for credibility assessments. The Swedish Migration Court of Appeal has 
endorsed the criteria for credibility assessments laid down by UNHCR in its 
Handbook, and in a recent case the Court held that in assessing the credibility of an 
applicant’s statements emphasis should be put on consistency and the absence of 
contradictions.134 Further, the Court specified that the applicant’s submission is not to 
contradict commonly known facts, such as current country of origin information; and 
importance is also attached to that key characteristics of the story remain unchanged 
throughout the asylum process.  
 
4.1.1 Confronting applicants with negative credibility findings 
As will become clear from the following chapters, some findings of non-credibility 
are reached on dubious grounds. In such cases, the decision may turn on whether the 
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applicant is given a chance to explain why her statements were inconsistent between 
two separate retellings; why country information paints a different picture than her 
testimony; or why her story is plausible although it may not appear as such to the 
decision-maker. It is therefore highly interesting to investigate whether domestic law 
grants the applicant such an opportunity, or whether it remains within the discretion 
of the decision-maker. The Australian legal system puts great emphasis on the 
requirements of procedural fairness. Its Migration Act dictates that the Refugee 
Review Tribunal must give the applicant clear particulars of any information that the 
Tribunal considers would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the 
negative asylum decision, and must further invite the applicant to comment on or 
respond to it.135 According to one commentator, however, this does not mean that 
every doubt as to an applicant’s credibility need to be put to her prior to making a 
decision,136 and one immigration judge has noted that if the Tribunal were obliged to 
reveal its process of reviewing, this would give the applicant an opportunity to 
strengthen her case.137 Coffey has however argued that the Migration Act sets the 
disclosure requirement more narrowly than is defined in the common law.138 In 
Canada, too, the law is somewhat unsettled on this matter. While one prominent case 
has held that generally speaking there is no obligation on the decision-maker to signal 
its conclusions on the general credibility of the evidence,139 the Federal Court has also 
held that the decision-maker should afford the applicant an opportunity to clarify the 
evidence and to explain apparent contradictions or inconsistencies within the 
testimony.140 In a different case the Federal Court has declared that there is no 
obligation on the decision-maker to alert the applicant of its concerns about 
weaknesses of testimony giving rise to implausibilities.141 It may thus be that 
Canadian law makes a distinction between the obligation to confront an applicant 
with negative credibility assessments based on inconsistencies and contradictions, 
which should be brought to her, and between similar findings based on 
implausibilities, which decision-makers are not obliged to flag. Even if this distinction 
is a correct interpretation of the law, it cannot be said that a clear obligation exists on 
the part of the decision-maker to confront the applicant with negative credibility 
findings. Finally, a few words may be said about the Swedish law in this area. The 
Swedish Aliens Act does stipulate that applicants should be given an opportunity to 
express an opinion on the circumstances invoked in the case,142 but in practice it 
seems that information that is interpreted as having a negative effect on credibility is 
often not communicated to the applicant.143  
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4.1.2 Partial non-credibility and its effects 
A further issue of great consequence for the outcomes of asylum claims is the 
relationship between findings of partial non-credibility and the overall credibility of 
the applicant’s testimony. Another way of inquiring into this relationship is to look at 
whether findings of non-credibility must concern central aspects of an applicant’s 
claim in order to dismiss all of her evidence as not admissible in building towards the 
standard of proof of a well-founded fear of being persecuted. The US REAL ID Act 
has adopted an extremely strict standard in this regard, stating that decision-makers 
can make credibility assessments “without regard to whether an inconsistency, 
inaccuracy or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”144 This means that 
even more peripheral credibility flaws can be fatal to the whole of an applicant’s 
claim. This is not the prevalent approach in most of the jurisdictions being scrutinised 
here, though. In Sweden, for example, the Migration Court of Appeal has made a 
distinction between the general credibility of the applicant and specific findings of 
non-credibility. In one recent case, the Court held that the segments of the applicants’ 
statements which were found to lack credibility concerned only one separate event 
and therefore they did not constitute grounds for questioning the applicants’ general 
credibility.145 Likewise, a seminal decision by Canada’s Federal Court of Appeal held 
that even if there are inconsistencies or exaggerations, the decision-maker must still 
go on to assess the evidence which is found to be credible and determine the claim as 
the totality of the evidence warrants,146 thus clearly embracing the possibility of 
partial non-credibility while other aspects of the applicant’s testimony are accepted as 
evidence of a well-founded fear. Adverse finding of credibility based on 
contradictions in testimony must be based on real contradictions or discrepancies that 
are of a significant or serious nature;147 however, the Federal Court of Appeal has also 
emphasised that while discrepancies and contradictions considered individually might 
have seemed insignificant, when taken together and considered in context, they may 
support a finding of lack of credibility.148 Even so, it is nevertheless clear that the 
Canadian system takes a fragmented approach to credibility findings, accepting that 
an applicant whose statement is not credible in some parts may nonetheless be a 
credible source with regard to other information. The UK’s Asylum and Immigration 
Tribunal has taken a similar approach, saying that it is “perfectly possible for an 
adjudicator to believe that a witness is not telling the truth about some matters, has 
exaggerated the story to make his case better, or is simply uncertain about matters, but 
still to be persuaded that the centrepiece of the story stands.”149  
 
4.2 Appealing credibility assessments 
Since credibility assessments in asylum claims are fraught with pitfalls and 
ambiguities, yet so central that whole asylum decisions often hinge on them, the 
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opportunity to appeal a credibility finding may render a different outcome to a case. 
However, credibility findings are findings of fact, and thus not generally eligible for 
review on appeal in common law systems. Refugee status determination processes are 
often reviewed in separate courts and tribunals, and may not conform to the general 
appeals system in the legal system. This section will briefly look at the structures in 
place for appeals of asylum decisions, with particular regard to appeals of credibility 
assessments.  
 
In the US, the first-instance decision-maker in asylum claims is an immigration judge. 
Immigration judges’ credibility assessments and other findings of fact will not be 
reviewed de novo, but are reviewed by the Board of Immigration Appeals using a 
‘clearly erroneous standard.’150 A decision is clearly erroneous if the Board is 
convinced that the immigration judge was mistaken.151 Importantly, this means that an 
immigration judge’s fact finding is not to be overturned simply because the Board 
would have weighed the evidence or decided the facts differently from the judge.152 
Decisions on non-credibility must thus meet a rather high standard in order to be 
eligible for review, even on the first instance of appeal.153 According to one 
commentator, this appellate system does not properly filter erroneous credibility 
determinations.154  
 
In Australia, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship decides claims of 
asylum at the first instance. The Refugee Review Tribunal conducts merits reviews of 
such cases, making decisions within the same legislative framework as the primary 
decision-maker.155 The entire evidence must be reconsidered in reviewing a 
decision.156 The Tribunal’s decision may in turn be reconsidered on judicial review, 
however the Tribunal’s decisions are not frequently set aside on the basis of its 
treatment of credibility157 since this requires an error of law. There are several ways in 
which a credibility finding could potentially constitute an error of law, for example, 
where there is no evidence for the finding.158 This is a strict criteria, though, and any 
slight inconsistency in an applicant’s submission for which there is some evidence 
will render the finding immune to the no evidence rule.159  
 
Canada’s first-instance decision-maker is the Refugee Protection Division of the 
Immigration and Refugee Board. Its decisions may be appealed to the Refugee 
Appeals Division – also within the Immigration and Refugee Board – on a question of 
fact, law or a combination thereof.160 After this point, the only route of appeal is 
judicial review. Since credibility assessments are considered to be within “the 
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heartland of the discretion of triers of fact,” they are entitled to considerable deference 
upon judicial review and cannot be overturned unless they are perverse, capricious or 
made without regard to the evidence.161 Just like in the US and Australia, it has been 
recognised that it is not the role of the appellate courts on judicial review to substitute 
its decision for that of the Board, even if they might not have reached the same 
conclusions.162 
 
In the UK, the first-instance decision-maker in asylum claims is the UK Border 
Agency, an agency of the Home Office. Decisions can be appealed to the First-tier 
Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) of the Immigration and Asylum 
Tribunal, and they will try questions of fact anew. Leave to appeal to the Upper 
Tribunal is rare, and will in any case not make a new finding on the credibility issue. 
Further, just like in the other common law jurisdictions credibility assessments are 
difficult to overturn on judicial review, and the Court of Appeal only has limited 
possibilities to allow challenges to the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal’s findings 
of fact.163  
 
Finally, applications for asylum submitted in Sweden are first considered by the 
Swedish Migration Board. The decisions may be appealed to the Migration Court,164 
which will reconsider questions of fact as well as of law. Leave to appeal to the 
Swedish Migration Court of Appeal may only be granted if it is of importance for the 
guidance of the application of the law that the appeal is examined, or if there are other 
exceptional grounds for examining the appeal.165 It is notable that compared to other 
appellate administrative courts on the same level, one ground of appeal is missing: 
leave to appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal will not be granted on the basis of 
there being reason for change in the decision that was reached, which is otherwise 
allowed in the Swedish administrative Courts of Appeal.166 The Swedish government 
has justified this distinction by reference to the Migration Court of Appeal being the 
senior court on migration matters, and thus responsible for setting precedence. In 
order for the Migration Court of Appeal to be able to fulfil this requirement, leave to 
appeal is only to be granted in exceptional circumstances.167 
 
In summary, it is clear that credibility assessments are not extensively regulated in the 
domestic frameworks that this chapter has looked into. Consequently, most decision-
makers experience considerable discretion with regard to how they assess the 
credibility of applicants’ testimony. Against this background, this thesis will now 
move on to the main research question and investigate how decision-makers use this 
discretion in conducting evaluations of credibility, and what problems that arise in 
this exercise. 
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5. Internal consistency 
 
In the refugee status determination process, it is presumed that a credible applicant 
will give an internally consistent account. For the purpose of credibility assessments 
in asylum claims, internal inconsistencies refer to situations where the applicant has 
rendered an inconsistent account or has changed the nature of the claim.168 This 
highlights two particular situations which are both common in asylum proceedings, 
namely when the applicant provides contradictory information in the factual account 
of her story – possibly from one interview to another or even within the same 
interview – and when the applicant adds important information with regard to her risk 
of being persecuted at a late stage in the refugee status determination process. Such 
inconsistencies and late disclosures often give rise to doubts about the applicant’s 
credibility, for, as Doornbos has explained, there is an assumption that a ‘genuine’ 
refugee is able to present her case without any inconsistencies and can reproduce it at 
any time during the process.169 In their study of beliefs about deception among 
Swedish Migration Board personnel working with asylum cases, Granhag and 
Strömwall found that “seeking contradictions” was the most frequent rule of thumb 
employed for distinguishing between liars and truth-tellers.170 The Migration Board 
personnel also believed that liars’ statements are less consistent over time than are 
truthful ones,171 thus explaining the considerable reliance placed on consistency in 
credibility assessments of asylum applicants. The notion that consistency implies truth 
whereas inconsistency implies deception has been termed the ‘consistency heuristic,’ 
and it seems that judges and other professional lie-catchers rely on it in a rather 
mechanical way.172 However, another study by the same authors has shown that 
truthful and deceptive statements are about equally consistent over time.173  
 
The overwhelming reliance placed on inconsistency as a sign of non-credibility has 
enormous consequences in refugee status determination processes, since applicants 
often have to give rather detailed testimony of their experiences at several different 
occasions and in various settings. For example, Kagan has noted that by the end of the 
US immigration court hearing – which is only the first instance decision-making 
forum – the applicant has likely told her story at least three times separated by many 
months.174 Against this background it is not surprising that internal inconsistencies is 
the most widely cited reason for refusing applicants’ credibility.175 Various laws of 
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procedure also lend support to this criterion: for example, the EU Procedures 
Directive allows for accelerated examination procedures when an applicant has made 
inconsistent or contradictory representations which make her claim clearly 
unconvincing.176 But there is a whole range of explanations, quite apart from 
deceitfulness, that can justify internal inconsistencies in an applicant’s testimony. The 
following chapter will discuss some of these reasons under three sections: memory 
effects; the role of interpreters; and particular reasons for late disclosures. Of course, 
some ‘internal inconsistencies’ are also wholly derived from mistakes or outright 
ignorance on the side of the decision-maker: this will not be further discussed below, 
but one example will be provided which demonstrates the effect that a rather small 
inconsistency can have.  One UK decision-maker wrote in the refusal letter to a Sri 
Lankan applicant that “[i]t is considered inconsistent that in your screening interview 
you claimed that you surrendered at Vattuvakkal, then detained [sic] at Mullaitivu and 
then transferred to Omanathy, whereas in you asylum interview you claimed to have 
first surrendered at Mullaitivu.”177 On appeal, the immigration judge instead noted 
that “[t]he [applicant] gave a reasonable explanation for the apparent inconsistency 
[…] stating that Vattuvakkal lies within Mullaitivu district.”178  
 
5.1 Memory effects 
Rejections of credibility – and, consequently, of refugee status – based on internal 
inconsistencies of an applicant’s testimony can spring from more or less any kind of 
contradiction in the applicant’s account.179 A typical example is when the applicant is 
inconsistent in specifying the point in time at which particular events occurred. In a 
recent case decided in the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal, for instance, the 
applicant gave inconsistent evidence as to when his friend had begun practicing Falun 
Gong. The reasoning merits a longer extract: 
 
At one stage in the hearing [the applicant] stated that [the friend] had been 
practicing for seven or eight years. At another point in the hearing he indicated 
that he had been aware that [the friend] had been practicing since 2008. When 
this inconsistency was put to the applicant he replied that he had recently 
telephoned his wife and was worried that if he returned to China he would be 
arrested and that this was affecting his ability to recall details correctly. If the 
applicant’s ten year friendship with [the friend] was close enough that he hid 
him as a fugitive from the law […] the tribunal would expect that no matter 
how stressed the applicant would consistently remember whether [the friend] 
started practice in 2004/2005 just a couple of years after they met or in 
2008.180 
 
This discrepancy with regard to when the applicant’s friend began practicing Falun 
Gong turned out to be one of the reasons for why the credibility of his testimony was 
rejected. Quite apart from showing a blatant disregard for the impact of fear of being 
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returned and for the difference between the applicant knowing of the practice since 
2008 as opposed to the friend having been practicing since 2004, the extract also 
demonstrates the prominence that asylum decision-makers often put on remembering 
dates and other time-related information. However, a number of factors can be 
mentioned that preclude placing much weight on the ability to correctly remember 
such information in assessing the credibility of an applicant’s account. Studies have 
consistently shown that after about two weeks, individuals have difficulty accurately 
dating their past experiences, suggesting that date of occurrence information is not 
typically retained in our memories.181 It is also unrealistic to expect applicants to 
remember the dates of exactly those events that the decision-maker finds important, as 
the dates that a person will commit to memory are highly individual and often 
surprising.182 Is it really that astonishing that the applicant in the above-mentioned 
case did not commit to his memory when his friend began practicing Falun Gong, 
when this did not even directly involve his own person? Furthermore, asylum 
decision-makers in Western countries of arrival must take care to remember the 
extensive emphasis that is put on time in our societies as opposed to many others. 
Linear time is a relatively new addition to our collective consciousness,183 and the 
absolute distance of an event in the linear past is “nearly always useless 
information”184 – except in a refugee claim, as noted by Cameron. Given the 
extensive research that points to the frailty of human memory for dates and times, it 
seems inherently wrong to place much emphasis on inconsistencies between 
statements designating different points in time for the occurrence of various events.  
 
In addition to the particular difficulty of accurately dating our memories, the 
substance of those memories themselves are much frailer than many asylum decision-
makers seem to think. It is not the purpose of this thesis to plunge into psychological 
research on human memory: however, it will take the opportunity to mention some 
findings which should inform assessments of credibility based on the internal 
consistency of an applicant’s account. The overarching fact which must be 
remembered is that “human memory is nothing like a video recording:” it is neither 
complete nor stable.185 Long-term memory is thought by researchers to be coded by 
meaning, and then linked to related information and associations. Thus, what is 
recorded is not an accurate copy of data but an interpretation.186 There are two 
particular reasons for why consistency in retelling our truthful memories is so 
difficult. Firstly, all memories are reconstructions, but certain kinds of information are 
not easily reconstructed and will need to be estimated or illustrated anew each time 
the memory is being described, thus easily leading to discrepancies with regard to 
specific facts.187 Also, when people are asked to repeat information that they have 
already given they tend to assume that the first account is unsatisfactory in some way 
and may try to rectify this by supplying different details of the events. Secondly, over 
time a memory may change owing to a number of memory effects.188 Research shows 
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that there is a more or less linear loss of autobiographic memory,189 but that mental 
rehearsal of related information may actually speed up the rate at which we lose 
information.190 If an asylum applicant has practiced his testimony, he may therefore 
be more prone to forget peripheral details relating to the events he tells about. In 
addition, ample research has made clear that “[i]t is not justified to assume that all 
details are well retained because they occurred within an emotional scenario.”191 But 
asylum decision-makers tend to regard richness of detail as an indicator of 
truthfulness, and will often ask specific questions about the circumstances which the 
applicant tells about. If the applicant cannot answer such questions, or gives 
inconsistent answers, this is all too often dismissed as an indication of deceitfulness. 
To complicate matters further, memories are not only lost but also regained. There is 
a difference between ‘storage failure,’ which denotes that a memory has been lost, 
and ‘retrieval failure’ which suggests that finding the right cues can result in 
successful recall.192 Memory blocks may persist for long times, but ‘pop-up’ recall 
can occur later on and open up for remembering specificities. ‘Hypermnesia’ is the 
term used to describe the observation that people remember more details with 
repeated recalls.193 It is a “consistent, robust and reliable” phenomenon and it 
commonly gives rise to up to a 50 per cent net gain in memory through repeated 
recall.194 Thus, repeated interviews where asylum applicants testify about their 
experiences over and over again may give rise to considerably more detailed accounts 
than initial interviews do, without this implying deceitfulness or that the latter 
information is any less accurate. Sadly, however, internal inconsistencies in an 
applicant’s account by way of providing considerably more information at later 
recounts are often taken to indicate that the applicant is not credible.195 By way of 
comparison, international criminal law has explicitly recognised the frailty of human 
memory and its limitations as reliable testimony. In Akayesu, the Trial Chamber 
stated that “[t]estimony is based mainly on memory and sight, two human 
characteristics which often deceive the individual […] Hence testimony is rarely exact 
as to the events experienced. To deduce from any resultant contradictions and 
inaccuracies that there was false testimony would be akin to criminalising frailties in 
human perceptions.”196  
 
All the aforementioned memory effects certainly raise doubts about whether 
inconsistencies in asylum applicants’ accounts can actually render such accounts not 
credible, especially so if the decision-maker is not trained in psychology and not able 
to assess the likely influence of such factors in the particular case. But the situation is 
even more critical when the applicant has been subjected to trauma. The primary 
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defence used to cope with extreme trauma is dissociation, constituting a structured 
separation of memory, emotions, thoughts, and identity.197 Because time and ideas of 
the self are distorted, autobiographical memory is negatively affected. The result is 
that inconsistencies in autobiographical memory are almost the norm in trauma 
victims.198 Victims of trauma that continue to suffer symptoms such as distressing 
recall, flashbacks, irritability and social withdrawal for more than one month are 
diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a condition which further 
complicates the capacity to communicate the trauma.199 Although trauma and PTSD 
are often mentioned as factors to take into consideration when assessing the 
credibility of asylum seekers’ testimony,200 in practice decision-makers may fail to 
attach much significance to them. For example, an Asylum Aid report tells of an 
applicant whose husband had been killed by Sierra Leonean rebels; who had herself 
been kidnapped together with her two children; who was raped on multiple occasions; 
and whose children were eventually killed, too.201 When she applied for asylum in the 
UK, she had with her a report from the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of 
Torture which specifically stated that it was extremely painful for the applicant to go 
over the deaths of her family members. During the interview itself, the applicant 
repeatedly stated how difficult she found talking about her experiences. Her claim 
was refused for lacking credibility, and the refusal letter picked up on contradictory 
information given with regard to when the applicant’s family members were killed: 
“In your screening interview, you claim that you husband and two sons all passed 
away in 1998, however, at two different points in your asylum interview, you claim 
that your eldest son and husband were killed in 2000, and your youngest son was 
killed in 2001 […] It is considered reasonable to expect you to recall with consistency 
the years in which your family members were allegedly killed.”202 Given the trauma 
that the applicant had been subjected to, it may not be so “reasonable” to expect her to 
accurately specify the time of these events on each occasion that she has to tell about 
them.  
 
5.2 The role of interpreters 
Language interpretation can substantially affect the accuracy of oral testimony and the 
assessment of the applicant’s credibility.203 Interpretation is almost inevitable in many 
asylum proceedings, but it results in the applicant’s removal from direct 
communication with the judge – “[t]he interpreter’s words become those of the 
applicant, her voice becomes that of the applicant, and interpreter errors may be 
attributed to the applicant.”204 In some central respects, the applicant’s credibility is 
essentially filtered through the interpreter. Notably, the translation offered by the 
interpreter may be markedly less consistent than the original version told by the 
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applicant.205 According to Granhag and Strömwall’s study on Swedish Migration 
Board personnel’s beliefs about deception, nine out of ten believed that the interpreter 
causes trouble in this assessment.206 This points to high awareness of the problem 
among decision-makers – at least in this particular group – but even so it seems that 
many find it difficult to fully appreciate the role that the interpreter plays in rendering 
applicants’ testimony internally inconsistent. Below we will briefly discuss three 
central translation problems that may lead decision-makers to declare applicants not 
credible.  
 
5.2.1 Choosing one translation over another 
The importance of giving consistent information with regard to dates has already been 
pointed out. This is not only complicated by shortcomings of human memory, but also 
by translations from one language to another. In his study of asylum appeals in the 
UK, Good observed that considerable confusion surrounds the translation of dates 
from non-Gregorian calendars.207 He gives the example of a Tamil asylum applicant, 
whose credibility was contested because he variously stated that he had arrived in 
Colombo on 21 August and 21 September. Good explains why these contradictions 
arose: months in the Tamil calendar are out of phase with those in the Gregorian 
calendar, and the Tamil month called “Avani” begins in mid-August and ends in mid-
September. If the interpreters used at the initial interview and subsequent court 
hearings translate “Avani” differently, an internal inconsistency will appear to have 
arisen – even if the applicant gave the same answer on both occasions.208 Similarly, 
an Estonian applicant belonging to a Russian minority had submitted in her written 
application that she had been “raped,” but in court she only testified that she had been 
“violated” by being fondled through her clothes. This particular applicant was lucky, 
for the decision-maker pressed counsel to find the interpreter from the first statement 
who then testified in court that the Russian word for ‘rape’ may also be used to denote 
a lesser violation of a woman’s body, and hence her credibility was not undermined 
by the discrepancy.209 As a final example, a selective translation of the Tamil word 
for ‘brother’ put one applicant’s credibility at jeopardy. At the hearing the applicant 
told the court that he had two brothers in the Tamil Tigers, but at the initial interview 
it had only been reported that he had one brother who was a member of the group. 
This inconsistency was likely based on selective translation: everyday Tamil has no 
composite term for ‘brother,’ instead it has one term denoting ‘elder brother’ and 
another denoting ‘younger brother.’ It is very likely that the asylum applicant started 
talking about his ‘younger brother’ at the initial interview and that this was simply 
translated as “one brother.”210  
 
5.2.2 Leaving out parts of testimony 
Sometimes interpreters do not translate all the details that applicants include in their 
oral testimony. This can turn out to be of crucial importance. A striking example is 
the translation of an El Salvadorian woman’s testimony when she applied for asylum 
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in the US: to the question of whether her husband reported her to the military as a 
guerrilla she replied “No, but he threatened to;” however, her answer was reduced to a 
simple “No” by the interpreter.211 Many asylum applicants understand some of the 
language being spoken by the interviewer or decision-maker although they do not 
know it well enough to fully manage without an interpreter. Consequently, applicants 
have themselves drawn attention to situations where the interpreter has only translated 
part of the testimony.212 One applicant even tells of how the interpreter stopped her 
from talking, saying “Tell that to your solicitor.”213 Without a doubt, these kinds of 
subjective assessments by interpreters with regard to which information is important 
to pass on to the decision-maker can result in inconsistencies between how an 
applicant’s testimony is recorded at one occasion as compared to another. Notably, 
however, much more subtle exclusions may also influence how the applicant’s 
credibility is perceived. An experimental study by Berk-Seligson found that when 
interpreters omitted to translate the words spoken by a witness marking politeness, 
mock jurors’ perceptions of the witnesses’ convincingness and truthfulness were 
remarkably different from when such words were indeed translated.214  
 
5.2.3 Mistakes 
The interpreters used in asylum proceedings are not machines, but human beings: 
consequently, they sometimes make mistakes. Anker witnessed a case with an 
Ethiopian applicant in which the applicant was asked if any of her family members 
had been killed. She answered that her grandfather had been killed, but the interpreter 
misinterpreted her response as “uncle.” Later during the cross-examination, the 
interpreter correctly translated her response as “grandfather.” The judge found that the 
applicant lacked credibility, and cited this error as one of the reasons for his 
decision.215 This type of trivial mistake should not under any circumstances be 
allowed to play a decisive role in the outcome of an asylum claim. It is one of the 
clearest examples of the oversimplification that reliance on internal inconsistencies as 
a basis for findings of non-credibility can lead to.  
 
5.3 Particular reasons for late disclosures 
It is quite common that asylum seekers provide more information at later interviews 
and hearings than they do at the initial screening interview. Such information may 
consist of additional details regarding events that they have already told about, and 
may be attributed not only to hypermnesia but also to the applicant having obtained 
more information of relevance to her claim at a later hearing.216 However, the new 
information that surfaces further into the refugee status determination process may 
also be of great importance for the determination of the claim. A common example is 
late disclosure of having been subjected to rape in the country of origin. Even though 
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UNHCR has cautioned that applicants may be reluctant to reveal the true extent of the 
persecution they have suffered, especially in connection to gender-related claims,217 
late disclosure is sometimes interpreted by decision-makers as a sign of non-
credibility. For instance, in the US case of Mousa v. Mukasey both the immigration 
judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals found the applicant’s failure to mention 
at her pre-testimonial written asylum application the fact that she had been raped to be 
a fatal flaw in her credibility. However, the Court of Appeals rejected this finding and 
held that “the assumption that the timing of a victim’s disclosure of sexual assault is a 
bellwether of truth is belied by the reality that there is often delayed reporting of 
sexual abuse.”218 The following sections will discuss two particular explanations as to 
why applicants do not initially choose to share all their experiences with the parties in 
the refugee status determination process.  
 
5.3.1 Distrust in state authorities or interpreters 
In many – if not most – countries of the world, state authorities are not synonymous 
with justice and trustworthiness. It must be remembered that many refugees are 
persons fleeing persecution committed or acquiesced by state actors. Consequently, it 
should not be surprising that they may find it difficult to entrust their life stories, the 
very reasons for why they fear being persecuted, to a state official in a foreign 
country. UNHCR recognises this complication,219 and Kagan has explained that 
applicants may have learned by experience in repressive political systems to be very 
hesitant about revealing information to strangers, especially if they are state 
officials.220 As an example, he refers to a Sudanese applicant for asylum in Egypt who 
had spent several months in a Sudanese prison lying to the jailers about his ethnic 
identity, since members of his tribe actively opposed the government. For this 
applicant to reveal all his personal details in an asylum claim to a foreign government 
which was at the time closely allied with the Sudanese government that he was 
fleeing from would understandably require a substantial leap of faith.221 Quite apart 
from the state officials conducting the asylum procedure, an even more suspect actor 
from the applicant’s point of view may be the interpreter that is often needed to 
convey the testimony. For the translation of widely spoken languages it may be 
possible to use interpreters from different nationalities than that of the applicant, but 
in many situations the applicant and the interpreter come from the same country. 
Kälin has pointed out that in such situations asylum seekers often suspect the 
interpreter of being a collaborator with the embassy of their country, who may pass on 
information to the persecuting government.222 Applicants may also find themselves 
having to tell their story to an interpreter from a rivalling tribe or group, making it 
                                                
217 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution Within the 
Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, 7 May 2002, HCR/GIP/02/01, para. 35. 
218 Mousa v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2008), cited in B. Einhorn (2009), supra note 209, p. 
189. 
219 “A person who, because of his experiences, was in fear of the authorities in his own country may 
still feel apprehensive vis-à-vis any authority. He may therefore be afraid to speak freely and give a full 
and accurate account of his case:” UNHCR Handbook (2011), supra note 23, para. 198.  
220 M. Kagan (2002), supra note 8, p. 392. 
221 M. Kagan (2002), ibid.  
222 W. Kälin (1986) ‘Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings in the Asylum-
Hearing,’ International Migration Review 20:2, p. 233. 
 39 
hard for them to feel safe and have trust in the interview.223 These factors clearly 
complicate reliance on early disclosure as an indicator of the credibility of the 
applicant, as the credibility of the applicant’s account is wholly unconnected to the 
trust that she is able to put in the actors of the refugee status determination process.  
 
5.3.2 Conceptions of privacy and shame 
Experiences relating to sexual violence and rape are particularly prone to be revealed 
at late stages of asylum proceedings. This is without a doubt closely connected to the 
fact that sexual violence is a taboo subject in many cultural contexts.224 Individuals 
that have been subjected to such abuses may become stigmatised, but they may also 
bring great shame on their families. Against this background it is not surprising that 
many hesitate to reveal their sufferings, especially if the interpreter belongs to the 
same diaspora as the applicant and the latter perceives a risk that details of the 
testimony may reach this group. Furthermore, for many women it is absolutely 
unthinkable to talk to a male interviewer or interpreter about such matters. In a study 
of asylum seekers’ perceptions of UK Home Office interviews a female applicant is 
quoted describing her experience of telling about rape:  
 
It was so hard to speak to men that were not related to me. I just can’t explain 
how hard it was. And I did not explain everything because I could not. I never 
talked about what happened to me in my whole life, not even to my mom. So 
suddenly I had to talk to three men I did not know. It was so hard. I just could 
not say what I wanted to say.225 
 
This passage captures the agony that the act of telling can amount to, and how the 
wrong circumstances (notably, using a male interviewer to hear the claim of a female 
applicant) can turn into an insurmountable hindrance to extracting the full testimony 
of the applicant. The importance of using female interviewers and interpreters for 
female applicants is widely recognised, for example in the UNHCR Guidelines on 
Gender-Related Persecution, which recommend that female applicants should 
automatically be provided with interviewers and interpreters of the same sex as 
themselves.226 Nevertheless, this is not always adhered to. It may be especially 
difficult to provide a female interpreter with regard to less widely spoken languages, 
but this can result in the applicant not telling her whole testimony at those occasions. 
For example, a Dinka woman who on appeal told about her rape said that she felt 
comfortable talking about it to UNHCR staff, but that she had not revealed it in 
interviews because the Dinka interpreters used were all male.227  
 
Das has written about the difficulty of talking about sexual violence in the aftermath 
of the Partition of India and Pakistan, where widespread rapes and abductions took 
place.228 It is one of countless examples where such methods have been used as a 
means of asserting dominance over enemy groups. Abducted women were considered 
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to have disgraced the family, and family narratives abound on men who were 
compelled to kill their women to save their honour.229 Many victims chose not to 
return at all, and those who did kept silent of their experience. Rather than bearing 
witness of the disorder, the violated women that did return to their families “drank 
their pain so that life could continue.”230 When Das asked women about their 
experiences from this period she encountered a “zone of silence,” which was achieved 
either by the use of general and metaphoric language that evaded specific description 
of capture, or by describing the surrounding events but leaving the actual experience 
of rape or abduction unstated.231 One woman warned that it was dangerous to 
remember: she compared memories to poison that makes the inside of the woman 
dissolve, as a solid is dissolved in a powerful liquid.232 The situations described by 
Das differ from the experience of asylum applicants in that Das’ interviewees were 
attempting to reintegrate into society and conserve peace and stability, whereas 
asylum applicants have chosen to break with the setting in which the violations took 
place. Nevertheless, Das’ insights are of relevance to credibility assessments in 
refugee status determination processes in that they signal the difficulty and 
unwillingness that victims of traumatic events may experience in retelling their 
stories. Das points out that a “fractured relation to language” has been documented for 
many victims of prolonged violence, for whom it is the “ordinariness of language that 
divides them from the rest of the world.”233 It may take some time before asylum 
applicants find the words to describe their experiences. This may not be done 
voluntarily, but only at the point when it is made clear that they will not be granted 
refugee status if they do not reveal these events. It is indeed very difficult to reconcile 
the strict format of a legal process and its requirement for explicit and detailed 
testimony with experiences of human rights violations – in particular, rape, sexual 
violence and other types of torture – that perhaps cannot be conveyed by words. Legal 
processes must take extreme care to investigate such events without reproducing the 
violence that they try to atone for. Das argues that some narratives cannot be told 
unless we see the relation between pain and language that a culture has evolved:234 it 
is certainly not obvious to all people to tell factual details about painful events in the 
setting of a legal process. On the one hand, the burden of proof rests mainly with the 
applicant and she is expected to present all the evidence that she holds in favour of 
her claim. On the other hand, decision-makers need to keep an open mind as to how 
evidence is presented in order not to violate the prohibition of refoulement, the other 
side of the coin of the right to be granted refugee status if an applicant fulfils the 
criteria under Article 1(A)(2). Non-refoulement thus implies an effort on the part of 
the decision-maker to discern the applicant’s experiences. Consequently, late 
disclosures of rape, sexual violence or other traumatic events must never be 
considered an irreproachable flaw of an applicant’s credibility. 
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6. External consistency 
 
In addition to requiring internal consistency, decision-makers routinely demand that 
credible asylum applicants should provide accounts of proceedings in their countries 
of origin that coincide with information about conditions in those same countries 
supplied by other sources. The external inconsistency of an asylum applicant’s 
account therefore refers to inconsistencies between the applicant’s factual account and 
the objective evidence concerning conditions in the country of origin.235 This is 
another well-established ground for assessing credibility, recognised by UNHCR in 
its Handbook;236 identified by Swedish Migration Board workers as the prime factor 
in making reliability assessments;237 and listed by Asylum Aid as the second most 
prominent reason for a negative credibility finding among female applicants in the 
UK.238 Coffey has argued that when it is accurate and relevant, country information is 
the “most reliable way of measuring the truthfulness of the applicant’s claims.”239 
Country of origin information (COI) is used within the refugee status determination 
process in two separate ways: first, to assess the risk on return for the applicant to her 
country of origin, and second, to assess the credibility of the applicant’s account.240 
The following analysis will focus on the latter, that is, how COI is used to assess the 
credibility of asylum applicants’ testimony.  
 
Decision-makers commonly base findings of external inconsistency on either a lack of 
objective evidence with regard to events that the applicant describes in her statements, 
or on COI providing a dissimilar or even a contradictory account of events as 
compared to that told by the applicant. An example of the first situation is provided 
by a British decision-maker who deemed an applicant’s account of being subjected to 
a large number of rapes and sexual assaults not credible. The decision-maker did not 
believe that such incidents would have gone unreported, asserting that “[t]here would 
have been numerous witnesses and something like that, particularly if repeated on 
many occasions would surely have been the subject of comment and report.”241 The 
problem with this approach is rather straightforward and will not require extensive 
analysis: suffice it to say that such reasoning grossly overestimates the informative 
value of country evidence. As will be further explored in the following sections, COI 
is invariably selective in its choice of materials and can never be expected to provide 
a complete account of the situation in a country as experienced by various individuals. 
Therefore, to base a negative credibility finding on the absence of COI corroborating 
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the applicant’s account constitutes fallacious reasoning. This is recognised by 
UNHCR, which has warned decision-makers from interpreting events referred to by 
an asylum applicant that are not well-documented as casting doubt on the applicant’s 
credibility:242 after all, “not being included in a country condition report does not 
mean that the person’s story is untrue.”243 It may be tempting for decision-makers to 
assume that events that they find dramatic or otherwise spectacular and which would 
have been publically acknowledged in the decision-maker’s own milieu must likewise 
have been widely reported in the applicant’s country of origin if they did in fact 
occur. However, to base a negative credibility assessment on the absence of such 
reporting cannot be an acceptable premise of deductive reasoning leading to judicially 
sound conclusions. The following sections will discuss the complex nature of COI 
and its limitations as a tool for decision-makers in assessing credibility, thus 
substantiating the inaccuracy of using external reporting as a condition and diverging 
reports as a litmus test of non-credibility. 
 
6.1 Problematising country of origin information 
In the context of the refugee status determination process, COI refers to accounts that 
detail the social, political, judicial and human rights profile of a given country.244 As 
noted by the Immigration Advisory Service, COI is a constructed field of knowledge 
that incorporates knowledge from a variety of disciplines and sources.245 It consists of 
studies and reports from a multitude of actors, such as governmental bodies, non-
governmental organisations, UN organs, the media, and expert witnesses. Decision-
makers often follow national or international guidelines as to how these different 
sources should be evaluated and what weight should be given to them as evidence in 
the asylum process. For example, UNHCR advises that it is important to ascertain 
who produced the information and for what purposes; whether the information 
producer is independent and impartial; and whether a scientific methodology has been 
applied.246 The International Association of Refugee Law Judges has raised other 
important considerations, such as the relevance of the COI to the case at hand; 
whether it adequately covers the relevant issues; and its temporal relevance.247 
However, the tendency demonstrated by decision-makers is that once a source has 
been evaluated according to such criteria and has passed these tests, it is considered as 
‘objective evidence.’ When COI attains this status as ‘objective evidence,’ the refugee 
status determination process appears to accept it as the one true account with regard to 
the circumstances it is describing, excluding other possible interpretations, 
explanations, or chains of events. Within this discourse, an applicant who offers a 
story that differs from the ‘objective evidence’ derived from COI is likely to be 
disbelieved. This acceptance of one particular paradigm at the expense of others is 
highly problematic, for several reasons.  
 
Firstly, ‘facts’ are rarely straightforward, but more often qualified by the particular 
perspective adopted or question being asked. For example, in a recent Immigration 
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Advisory Service report a legal representative described how a client applying for 
asylum in the UK was disbelieved in his account to be a teacher from Zimbabwe, 
because he had said that he taught children aged 7 to 17 in a primary school. 
However, the Home Office country information report gave a much more restrictive 
band for ages of primary school children in Zimbabwe, and because of that the 
decision-maker found that the applicant was not actually a teacher. But the legal 
representative recounted that it only took him a few minutes to find a UN report 
saying that primary schools in Zimbabwe, particularly in the rural areas, are jam-
packed with over-age children.248 The age of primary school children in Zimbabwe 
could be imagined as a simple query capable of producing a single accurate, factual 
answer. Yet, the aforementioned example demonstrates that there is a difference 
between de jure and de facto situations: the Home Office country report likely 
conveyed the primary school age as stipulated by law, either unaware of or not for its 
purposes concerned with the situation as it actually is in Zimbabwean classrooms. 
This example shows that very few pieces of information should be regarded as 
uncontested ‘facts’ that exclude all other analyses of a given situation. The Home 
Office country report can be correct in its description of the statutory primary school 
age band, but from this it does not follow that an applicant for asylum is lying when 
he describes having taught children of other ages in precisely such primary schools. 
The refugee status determination process must recognise that different sources of 
knowledge providing seemingly contradictory accounts can all be honest and truthful, 
based on their own perspective and understanding of the situation. This is widely 
acknowledged in the social sciences. For example, in describing anthropologists’ 
views of ‘facts’ Good states that ‘facts’ are always a product of a particular theoretical 
approach, and ‘truth’ is at best provisional and contested.249 Without doubt, this view 
of facts as inherently contested could not be accepted in the legal sphere, for then the 
system would not be able to render judgments. Nevertheless, asylum law in particular 
could benefit from a greater awareness of the sceptical approach to facts adopted by 
the social sciences. Decision-makers need to be aware of the particular perspectives 
they are endorsing when choosing one factual interpretation over another. 
Considering the grave consequences that an erroneous credibility assessment may 
have, ‘facts’ in the asylum process must always be handled with the greatest care.  
 
Secondly, to label some sources of knowledge as ‘objective evidence,’ while 
maintaining that the applicant’s account is necessarily subjective, runs the risk of 
ignoring important considerations with regard to COI. This blunt distinction assumes 
that it is possible to step outside one’s own perspective and to ignore the paradigms 
and reference points by which all human beings assess the world. As noted by Good, 
the positivistic overtones of the phrase ‘objective evidence’ seem to reflect a general 
failure by the parties to the asylum process to recognise the “contextualisation and 
subjectivity to which all knowledge is subject.”250 In addition to such more or less 
unconscious selections being made about how we interpret and evaluate information, 
it must also be noted that the different actors that produce the reports being introduced 
as COI commonly have certain mandates and interests to look after. This is not 
always properly considered by judicial decision-makers. For example, commenting on 
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the assessment of COI in its judgment N.A. v. The United Kingdom the European 
Court of Human Rights noted that through their diplomatic missions, states will often 
be able to provide highly relevant material.251 But diplomacy can also constitute a 
hindrance to extensive reporting: Bohmer and Schuman describe how legal 
representatives in the US believe that State Department reports are sometimes unduly 
kind to friendly or allied regimes, which means that they do not report the human 
rights abuses that are claimed by applicants for asylum.252 Moreover, non-
governmental organisations such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch 
that specialise in human rights abuses clearly tend to focus on instances of 
mistreatment, rather than on describing situations in which abuses do not occur. In 
this context, applicants for asylum have been disbelieved for lacking external 
consistency with such reports of abuses in cases where the decision-maker expects 
that they would have been similarly abused. In one asylum appeal an Australian 
decision-maker held that since “independent evidence” indicates that Falun Gong 
practitioners are subject to considerable monitoring it was not accepted that the 
applicant would have avoided the scrutiny of the authorities over a period of 12 years 
given her claimed extensive involvement in the movement.253 As information about 
the source of the COI was lacking in the written judgment it is not possible to analyse 
this source in depth, but if the “independent evidence” did come from an organisation 
specialising in human rights abuses it is not surprising that it would only include 
reference to situations where Falun Gong practitioners are monitored, and not provide 
supporting evidence for instances when this would not be the case. This is a kind of 
subjectivity on the part of COI producers, which becomes even clearer when we 
consider that the primary sources of COI are not usually produced with the refugee 
status determination process in mind. Although many refugee-receiving countries put 
together vast COI reports – see, for example, the Country of origin information 
service provided by the UK Border Agency254 – such reports are usually compilations 
of information derived from other sources, including UN organisations, human rights 
groups, and media outlets. Again, such sources usually have other objectives than 
providing information appropriate for grounding asylum decisions upon: for example, 
the primary aim of non-governmental organisations reporting on human rights abuses 
is often to mobilise political support for reform, and media reports tend to focus on 
sensational events that are likely to interest its audiences. Reports produced by 
governmental bodies and UN organisations, for their part, both suffer from diplomatic 
restraints. Consequently, it would seem that very few of the sources that COI draw on 
can be considered ‘objective’ in any meaningful sense. They may be honest and 
truthful in the information that they do convey, but none of them can be expected to 
provide an untainted account since they will focus on issues that suit their own 
purposes. For this reason, decision-makers should approach ‘objective evidence’ with 
some scepticism, even when it stems from well-respected sources. It must always be 
open to them to find an applicant credible, even when her factual account differs from 
external sources.  
 
 
                                                
251 N.A. v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 25904/07, Fourth Section, Judgment 17 July 2008, 
para. 121. 
252 C. Bohmer and A. Schuman (2008) supra note 216, p. 133. 
253 1205075 [2012], RRTA 851, 19 September 2012, para. 101. 
254 UK Border Agency, Country of origin information service, 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/coi/, last accessed on 22 May 2013. 
 45 
6.2 Evaluating applicants’ testimony in light of external sources  
While the foregoing section highlighted the complexity of the knowledge provided as 
COI, the following discussion will go one step further by analysing how decision-
makers can use such information in the refugee status determination process for the 
purpose of credibility assessments. Within the legal sphere, it is generally assumed 
that specialised immigration tribunals or courts are well placed to assess and evaluate 
the factual background to asylum claims. In the British context, Barnes has 
maintained that the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal is “recognised as possessing its 
own level of expertise as a specialist tribunal, not only in the legal issues for its 
determination, but also in its knowledge of country situations.”255 This view has been 
strongly contested by Good, a social anthropologist, who raises a very important point 
with regard to the skills amassed by decision-makers within the asylum process. Good 
argues that even though experienced asylum decision-makers become thoroughly 
informed at a factual level about, for example, the political histories of countries 
generating large number of asylum applicants, it is always necessary to distinguish 
between facts and their interpretation.256 His field research at an immigration tribunal 
in London led him to conclude that decision-makers were on far shakier ground when 
assessing the cultural significance of such ‘facts.’ As an example, Good recounts how 
one decision-maker told him that she had judged it implausible that a Hindu Tamil 
would have been helped by a Muslim as he claimed to have been, because the 
decision-maker thought that Muslims would have more in common with Buddhists 
than with Hindus.257 This assessment would likely be based on some form of COI 
which the decision-maker had drawn her own conclusions from. Being an expert on 
Sri Lanka with extensive research in that region, however, Good pointed out that 
Buddhists and Hindus worship the same deities, so there is no obvious reason why 
Muslims should prefer one to the other, while Sri Lankan Hindus and Muslims speak 
the same language whereas Buddhists speak a completely different one.258 This is an 
example of how the proper interpretation of facts about human behaviour requires a 
wider knowledge of their social setting.  
 
Within social anthropology a distinction is famously made between ‘thin description’ 
and ‘thick description,’ expressions originally coined by Ryle, a philosopher.259 While 
‘thin description’ refers to simple factual descriptions of information that plainly 
meets the eye, ‘thick description’ refers to the meaning afforded to this act within its 
given context. It is here suggested that these concepts can be used to demonstrate why 
decision-makers’ application of COI to evaluations of applicants’ external credibility 
is problematic. The COI presented in asylum processes rarely reaches beyond thin 
description of the situation in the country at hand. The much-quoted US Department 
of State Country Reports on Human Rights Practices provide good examples of this. 
They commonly contain very short descriptions of various human rights issues that 
focus on statistics and legal provisions. The 2012 report of The Gambia, for instance, 
describes the prevalence of female genital cutting (FGM) by reference to that the law 
does not prohibit the practice; that a UNICEF 2005-2006 survey found that almost 80 
percent of girls and women between the ages of 15 and 19 had undergone it; that 
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seven of the nine major ethnic groups practice FGM on girls from shortly after birth 
until age 16, and a few other similar pieces of information. Based on this source, it 
would surely be very difficult for a decision-maker to assess whether or not an 
applicant’s account of either being or not being subjected to FGM is consistent with 
the COI. Much more information – in particular, descriptions of a different calibre – 
are needed to assess the external consistency of such accounts. This was recognised in 
a recent country guidance case260 decided by the UK Upper Tribunal’s Immigration 
and Asylum Chamber, which heard evidence from two experts in order to gain a 
broader understanding of the factors that affect whether or not a girl or woman is at 
risk of being subjected to FGM.261 The experts in this case offered an understanding 
of the broader social context of the practice, and such knowledge is surely needed in 
order to grasp the prevalence of FGM, when it does or does not occur and why. ‘Thin 
descriptions,’ such as that found in the US Department of State Country Report, 
cannot achieve this. When knowledge and understanding about the social context of 
various occurrences is lacking, asylum decision-makers are not well placed to make 
qualified comparisons between the applicant’s account of her background and COI 
from other sources. As noted by Care, a former President of the International 
Association for Refugee Law Judges, “[c]ountry background material is only as good 
as the observers and rarely catches the local practices and nuances, which can be all 
important.”262 Consequently, decision-makers may not be equipped to assess whether 
an ‘inconsistency’ exists between the applicant’s account and external sources of 
information. It can certainly be argued that in order for such pronunciations to carry 
any validity, the decision-maker must have extensive knowledge of the intricate 
considerations and unstated norms that guide people’s behaviour in the given social 
setting. It is not enough to read a few pages of a COI report describing certain 
significant events in order to make a pronunciation to the effect that the applicant’s 
testimony is not consistent with generally known facts. A lot needs to be known about 
the background to these facts – the thick description – before that is acceptable as a 
step in assessing the credibility of an applicant who claims to fear persecution if she is 
returned.  
 
An example will be provided to demonstrate this point. In a recent judicial review by 
the Irish High Court of an asylum decision, the Court upheld the Refugee Appeals 
Tribunal’s finding that the applicant’s account of being captured by Janjaweed militia 
who explained their actions to the people around the applicant but left them unharmed 
was inconsistent with COI.263  According to COI, the Tribunal and the Court asserted, 
the Janjaweed were a loose category of fighters who had adopted a scorched earth 
strategy, and there was no information conveying the impression that the Janjaweed 
would be disposed to engaging in conversation with a group of displaced villagers. 
Against this background, the High Court found it reasonable “to have regard to the 
vicious nature of the militia” and to draw the inference of external inconsistency that 
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the Refugee Appeals Tribunal did.264 Clearly, the country information that this 
decision is based on is a ‘thin description’ of the actions of the Janjaweed. The 
decision-makers’ reasoning ignores that the militia is acting according to some 
standards of their own, which may be abhorrent to the decision-maker, but which 
nevertheless exist. It is not enough to refer to the “vicious nature” of the Janjaweed: 
such subjective and general standards have absolutely no value in making assessments 
about how members of the militia would act in a given situation. Consequently, the 
decision-maker cannot dismiss the credibility of an applicant’s account by reference 
to COI pertaining to another situation, which may appear comparable but which may 
nonetheless be governed by completely different norms, unknown to the decision-
maker because it is not relayed in the COI. The application of COI as part of a 
credibility assessment is therefore extremely delicate, and decision-makers must show 
much greater sensitivity to these problems than is currently the norm.  
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7. Plausibility 
 
A third way of testing the credibility of the applicant’s account looks at the 
plausibility or apparent reasonableness of the claim.265 According to Macklin, 
plausibility usually refers to the relationship between what the applicant describes and 
what we think we “know” about how the external world works.266 The rationale is that 
plausible testimony depicts a realistic, possible chain of events,267 and assessing 
plausibility has often been considered an exercise in common sense.268 Although this 
may seem a sensible criterion to include in credibility assessments, it has been 
described by commentators as the “most troubling” sort of findings of an applicant’s 
credibility,269 which “adds very little.”270 Assessments of the plausibility of an 
applicant’s account can be explained as being based on unspoken assumptions made 
by the decision-maker in question. In a qualitative study of a sample of UK asylum 
decisions, Herlihy et al. identified three broad categories of such assumptions on the 
part of the decision-maker. The categories in question referred to assumptions about 
how persons behave in the applicant’s country of origin; how the asylum system 
works in the country of arrival;271 and how a truthful account is presented.272 A 
further such category, not identified by Herlihy et al. but clearly very common in 
plausibility assessments, concerns assumptions about knowledge that the applicant 
should have if the account she is giving is indeed sincere. The tendency of decision-
makers to base plausibility assessments on unstated assumptions, often without 
reference to any other tangible evidence, has also been noted by Sweeney.273 With 
regard to assessments about the plausibility of human actions in the applicant’s 
country of origin, decision-makers sometimes refer to what a ‘reasonable man’ would 
have done in the circumstances. In this evaluation, decision-makers tend to project 
their own cultural and political experiences onto the applicant.274 As will become 
clear from the following section, this reasoning is highly problematic and has received 
sharp criticism also from within the judicial ranks. Nevertheless, ideas of the 
‘reasonable man’ or ‘common sense’ behaviour continue to feature in more or less 
concealed forms in a multitude of asylum decisions, and therefore merit extensive 
discussion in this chapter.  
 
In addition to discussing assumptions about behaviour in the applicant’s country of 
origin, this chapter will also discuss assumptions about knowledge that credible 
applicants are expected to have, and it will end with a short examination of the role of 
demeanour in asylum credibility assessments. This thesis has chosen to include 
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‘reasonable knowledge’ and ‘demeanour’ under the plausibility heading – although 
this is a somewhat unconventional division of credibility assessments – because these 
assessments, too, are essentially concerned with evaluations of plausibility and very 
much based on the decision-maker’s own framework of assessing what is reasonable 
and not. 
 
7.1 Assumptions about behaviour in the country of origin 
Decision-makers conduct plausibility assessments pertaining to all kinds of acts and 
actors featuring in asylum applicants’ stories.275 As previously explained, the refugee 
definition hinges on the future risk of the applicant being persecuted. Past persecution 
is not itself a prerequisite to being recognised as a refugee, but such events are 
regarded as important indicators of a future risk. Thus, even though a variety of 
different information may play a role in establishing a future risk of persecution, the 
most critical plausibility assessments tend to concern either the applicant’s actions in 
the face of persecution or the behaviour of the persecutor. Both these categories of 
plausibility assessments often take as their starting point the ‘reasonable man’ or 
‘common sense’ standard, and the plausibility of the applicant’s account is judged 
according to these yardsticks. For this reason, the following discussion of decision-
makers’ assumptions about behaviour in the applicant’s country of origin will begin 
with a discussion of the ‘reasonable man’ concept.  
 
7.1.1 The ‘reasonable man’ 
In common law systems, the idea of the ‘reasonable man’ is often used as an 
analytical tool; civil law has a similar concept in the bonus pater familias. In 
particular, it is relied on when determining liability in negligence, both in tort and 
criminal law. The legal question to be decided is whether by his alleged negligence 
the defendant fell below the standard of care to be expected of a ‘reasonable man.’276 
The ‘reasonable man’ is thus used to illustrate the care that each person is obliged to 
show other people in order not to be liable in tort or criminal law, serving the purpose 
of specifying the behaviour that members of society can expect from others. 
However, in credibility assessments within the asylum process the determinative point 
is whether it was plausible that the applicant and the persecutor really did act in the 
way that the applicant claims. This version of the ‘reasonable man’ test, which is 
sometimes instead formulated as a ‘common sense’ criterion, dictates what can and 
what cannot be true in accordance with the common experiences of life.277 Kälin has 
argued that while ‘common sense’ may be useful for functioning and interpreting 
within a particular society, it is not an effective means for judging the possibility and 
probability of events in societies different from one’s own: ‘common sense’ is not 
universally valid, but culturally determined.278 Likewise, with regard to the use of the 
‘reasonable man’ concept Lord Bingham famously declared that “[n]o judge worth his 
salt could possibly assume that men of different nationalities […] would act as he 
might think he would have done or even […] in accordance with his concept of what 
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a reasonable man would have done.”279 The reason for this is that the decision-makers 
in question base their conceptions of ‘common sense’ or the behaviour of the 
‘reasonable man’ on their own understanding of what that entails. It is very difficult to 
fully grasp the extent to which such perceptions are coloured by the society in which 
the individual passing this judgment has been brought up. Geertz, a well-known social 
anthropologist, has described common sense as a cultural system whose fundamental 
pillars vary between societies.280 In his view, it is an inherent characteristic of 
common sense thought to affirm that its tenets are “immediate deliverances of 
experience, not deliberated reflections upon it,” and if we are to analyse common 
sense we must begin by drawing a distinction between the mere matter-of-fact 
apprehension of reality and colloquial wisdom.281 Just like myth and other cultural 
systems, common sense is essentially an interpretation of the “immediacies of 
experience” and consequently a historical construction subjected to historically 
defined standards of judgment.282 Ethnographic studies of scores of societies around 
the world have plainly demonstrated that ‘common sense’ beliefs are not universally 
accepted. Geertz gives one example of how a Javanese family explains that the reason 
a boy has fallen out of a tree is that the spirit of his deceased grandfather pushed him 
because some ritual duty towards the grandfather had been overlooked;283 the 
remainder of this thesis could easily be spent reciting similar ethnographic anecdotes. 
The point is that while an average Westerner would consider it ‘common sense’ that 
the boy fell because he was careless in his movements while climbing, or because a 
branch happened to give in under the pressure, it was equally obvious to the Javanese 
family that this happened because of the grandfather’s spirit. This example seems far 
removed from the plausibility assessments conducted by decision-makers in refugee 
status determinations, but in order to make such plausibility assessment in an 
equitable way it is crucial to accept this insight. ‘Common sense’ is not science; it 
varies between societies, but in some version it is the measuring stick that human 
beings tend to adopt their behaviour to. Asylum decision-makers must always be 
acutely aware that what they consider to be ‘reasonable’ is not necessarily so in the 
eyes of the applicant, especially not in her country of origin. Luckily, many actors in 
the refugee status determination process are well aware of the reasoning advanced by 
anthropologists such as Geertz and many other social scientists that have conducted 
research on similar issues. As a consequence, extensive warnings have been issued 
with regard to basing credibility assessments in the refugee status determination on 
implausibility assessments.284 Nevertheless, such decisions abound,285 for they are 
permissible within the wide discretion left to decision-makers with regard to how 
evaluations of credibility are to be conducted. Keeping in mind the foregoing inquiry 
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into the concept of ‘common sense’ and the ‘reasonable man,’ we will now continue 
our investigation by taking a closer look at the types of assessments being made by 
decision-makers. 
 
7.1.2 The behaviour of the applicant 
A surprising variety of actions, reactions, events and emotions have been deemed 
implausible by asylum decision-makers over the years and across the globe. A telling 
example is provided by an Asylum Aid report, citing a UK first-instance refusal letter 
which reads “[y]ou claim you ‘fell in love.’ This is not consistent with the fact that 
you only saw him three times in total.”286 Assumptions about applicants’ emotions 
and the ways in which these guide their actions are of great importance in plausibility 
assessments. According to one US lawyer interviewed by Bohmer and Schuman, the 
people who face the greatest scepticism from judges are women who are not believed 
about actions they took vis-à-vis their children.287 Many decision-makers find it 
inherently implausible that a woman would leave her children when she fled, even 
though this may have been her only hope of getting out.288 Based on extensive studies 
of the refugee status determination process in the Netherlands, Spijkerboer has also 
come to the conclusion that women’s behaviour towards their families is regarded as 
an indicator of their credibility. If the female applicant’s behaviour is considered 
inappropriate, this diminishes her credibility.289 According to Spijkerboer, the 
deciding norm in these determinations is specifically Western and often traditional by 
any standard. He illustrates this type of credibility assessment with the example of a 
Turkish female applicant whose decision contained the following lines: 
 
It is surprising that the applicant has left her children behind in Turkey, as she 
has stated she left Turkey partly out of concern for the well-being of her 
children. It is not deemed probable that the children of the applicant will 
benefit from the departure of their mother abroad. This damages the 
statements of the applicant.290 
 
This kind of plausibility assessment is based on gender stereotypes and on culturally 
predicated assumptions about what kind of behaviour would be likely in that situation. 
They cannot be considered as reliable evaluations of whether the applicant in question 
is telling the truth about how and why she fled her country of origin. 
 
Another example of decision-makers’ occasional inability to appreciate conditions in 
a foreign setting relates to the conception of the state and the role of state actors. 
Anker recognises as a major source of misunderstanding among decision-makers the 
view of governmental authorities as benevolent.291 She describes how decision-
makers often are sceptical when an applicant had not reported abuses to the police. 
Further, Anker also notes the problematic decisions in the cases of several Nicaraguan 
and El Salvadorian applicants, who had testified that they unwillingly joined civil 
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patrols. The decision-makers in these cases displayed an inability to transcend their 
own cultural conceptions of military service as something voluntary, and did not 
understand that such a duty could be imposed extra-legally.292 It is clear that stories 
about distrust in state authorities and extra-legal obligations that the government 
cannot protect its people from do not accord with the Western conception of the state 
as founded on a mutual social contract between citizens and governmental authorities, 
whereby citizens can trust the ruling power to look after their interests. Since the 
institution of refugeehood is based on the inability or unwillingness of the state to 
protect the applicant from abuse, asylum decision-makers should be well aware that 
they cannot project their own expectations of state justice and the rule of law onto 
countries from which asylum seekers are fleeing. Nevertheless, plausibility 
assessments often construct the notion of ‘common sense’ behaviour in relation to the 
state according to the standards of a Western democracy. Falling below this standard 
may result in a finding of implausibility thus deeming the applicant’s statements not 
credible.  
 
A third example of problematic plausibility assessments concerning the behaviour of 
the applicant in her home country relates to assumptions about the evaluation of the 
risk that the applicant is facing. This is evident primarily in the applicant’s delay in 
fleeing, delay in asking for protection in the country of arrival, and in returning to her 
home in spite of fear of persecution.293 The underlying assumption is that an applicant 
who truly fears persecution would not act in this way, and therefore the story being 
told by the applicant is not credible.294 By reference to research on human responses 
to danger conducted within a variety of disciplines, Cameron has argued that such 
findings of implausibility are fundamentally unsound. She discusses a whole range of 
factors that influence how we assess risk, such as familiarity with the risk,295 
perceived controllability of the risk,296 and individual risk tolerance,297 making a good 
case for that asylum decision-makers need to be aware on current social science 
research pertaining to risk theory before pronouncing on the plausibility of applicants’ 
assessment of risk. This makes clear that both the personality of the applicant and the 
broader context of the society in which she is living play a part in how she assesses 
the risks she is facing, and this applies to persecution as well as to more mundane 
everyday risks. One example where the decision-maker failed to pay sufficient regard 
to the applicant’s assessment of the risk is provided by a Swedish asylum claim by an 
Iraqi applicant.298 The decision-maker questioned how the applicant’s girlfriend 
“dared to take pictures with her mobile phone camera of the two of you together if she 
was at risk of being murdered for the pictures, a risk that she should reasonably have 
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been aware of.”299 What may seem to the decision-maker in retrospect as an obvious 
risk – which a ‘reasonable man’ would not take – may have been evaluated by the 
applicant in a completely different way at the time. With regard to this particular 
decision, the decision-maker seemingly failed to consider that the applicant and his 
girlfriend were young, in love and together for the first time.300 The fact that the 
applicant and his girlfriend perceived of and assessed the risk in a different way from 
the decision-maker does not render the account of the event incredible.  
 
7.1.3 The behaviour of the persecutor 
Decision-makers’ assumptions about the plausible behaviour of persecutors can also 
constitute a sometimes insurmountable hindrance for asylum applicants. Credibility 
assessments of the stories told by applicants concerning the actions of persecutors can 
at times be rather absurd, for, as noted by Hathaway, “it is not in the nature of 
repressive societies to behave reasonably.”301 Rousseau et al. describe a claim by a 
Burmese applicant who testified that although her persecutors covered her eyes when 
kidnapping her, they failed to do so again upon her release. The decision-maker found 
this description to be contradictory, but Rousseau et al. argue that such a finding 
demonstrates the inability of the decision-maker to enter the ‘illogical’ atmosphere of 
terror and impunity.302 Sweeney also gives the example of an applicant’s account of 
his escape from his persecutors which the decision-maker found to be “inherently 
implausible,” because the applicant claimed to have gotten up from the ground and 
run away through the woods while three armed officials were shooting at him.303 As 
noted by Sweeney, though, there is nothing “inherently implausible” about this 
situation, because it could very well be that the police officers in question enjoyed 
watching their victim run away while scaring him with gunfire.304 It must be 
remembered that stories of persecution are by nature implausible, for trauma is 
defined as out of the ordinary and a disruption of everything that is usual.305  
 
According to Sweeney, decision-makers have constructed a notion of the ‘reasonable 
persecutor.’ Its use is very different from that of the ‘reasonable man’, though, for if 
the ‘reasonable persecutor’ falls short of the standard expected by his 
‘reasonableness,’ this results in the applicant being disbelieved.306 Sweeney argues 
that the ‘reasonable persecutor’ does not serve the same useful purpose that the 
‘reasonable man’ does in setting community standards, for the ‘reasonable persecutor’ 
does not live up to community norms and has not been arrived at by the same 
process.307 Instead, the ‘reasonable persecutor’ tends to be based upon the decision-
maker’s impression of how the persecution could have been better executed, but “[i]t 
is an impossibly high standard to require that to be believable the alleged persecutor 
must be described as having behaved with clinical ‘efficiency,’ because if they did so 
the [applicant] would not have escaped.”308 According to this analysis, the application 
of the ‘reasonable persecutor’ standard is based on a mistake between what Montrose 
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termed particular propositions of fact and general propositions of fact.309 Whereas the 
applicant is only claiming that the persecution happened to her in this way – in 
Montrose’s terminology, a particular proposition of fact – by referring to the 
‘reasonable persecutor’ standard the decision-maker is evaluating the statement as a 
general proposition of fact. Thus, the decision-maker can then easily come to the 
conclusion that the proposition is false because not all persecutors would behave in 
the way described.310 The same analysis is also applicable to assessments about the 
plausibility of the applicant’s own actions: they constitute a particular, not a general, 
proposition of fact, and ought not need to represent the behaviour of all kinds of 
persons in the same situation in order to be accepted as evidence. The tendency 
identified by Sweeney for decision-makers to seek general propositions of facts in 
assessing the plausibility of asylum applicants’ stories constitutes a flawed approach 
to the evaluation of the admissibility of facts. 
 
7.2 Assumptions about reasonable knowledge  
The plausibility of asylum applicants’ testimony has often been tested as against 
information which decision-makers consider that the applicant should know if she is 
honest in her account. This assessment is thus not concerned with the inherent 
plausibility of the applicant’s account as such, but with the plausibility of the 
applicant not having information about certain things that the decision-maker 
considers that she should be aware of. Here, too, decision-makers’ assumptions often 
fail to take account of the different cultural setting that the applicant originates from. 
Examples of this abound: in one US case the first-instance decision-maker rejected 
the applicant’s credibility because it was not considered plausible that she did not 
know the last name of the person that provided the family with passports in 
preparation of their flight. This decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which 
sensibly took into account the applicant’s assertion that it is customary in Cameroon 
to only know and refer to acquaintances by their first names.311 It is understandable 
that a decision-maker in the US, with its widespread culture of referring to 
acquaintances by their last name, would find such a lack of information implausible in 
her own setting. However, the decision-maker is not judging the plausibility of this 
event in the US. Plausibility assessments in refugee status determination proceedings 
must be fully focused on the particular social setting in which the alleged event took 
place. If they fail to make this distinction, they loose all value and validity. A further 
example is drawn from a claim by a Sri Lankan applicant seeking asylum in the UK. 
The applicant’s father had fled their country of origin several years earlier and had 
been recognised as a refugee in the UK, but the applicant testified that he did not 
know the details of his father’s persecution. This, together with the assertion that he 
did not know how much his mother had paid in bribe to release him from army 
detention, was held by the decision-maker to lack credibility.312 With regard to this 
case Good notes that both dismissals of credibility made by the decision-maker 
depend upon assumptions about normal behaviour within families “which do not take 
cultural context into account, assumptions all the more questionable concerning 
                                                
309 L. J. Montrose (1954) ‘Basic concepts of the law of evidence,’ The Law Quarterly Review 70, p. 
534, cited in J. Sweeney (2007), ibid, pp. 28-29. 
310 J. Sweeney (2007), ibid, p. 29. 
311 Agbor v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 2007). 
312 Nishanthan v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, unreported, 11 April 2001, Immigration 
Appeals Tribunal, cited in A. Good (2007), supra note 207, p. 202. 
 55 
secret, shameful matters like paying bribes.”313 Again, we see that plausibility 
assessments based on assumptions about reasonable knowledge are highly unsuited to 
the ipso facto cross-cultural setting of the asylum process. Paying close regard to 
conditions in foreign countries include that decision-makers must not assume that the 
applicant has received a corresponding education to that of himself and that he pays 
attention to the same kinds of matters: one UK decision-maker found it incredible that 
a Syrian asylum seeker could not correctly answer which states had opposed a 
Security Council resolution for Syria’s president to resign.314 By contrast, on appeal 
the immigration judge held that “[i]f as claimed [the applicant] has never had any 
education and has lived in a rural area without the benefit of electricity, it is just 
plausible that his information about his home country, as regards matters and events 
not within his immediate area, would be limited.”315 Furthermore, as will become 
clear from the next example, it is not always the case that the asylum process actors 
demanding such knowledge from credible applicants would themselves be able to live 
up to the high standard they erect. Cameron describes a scene from a Canadian 
courtroom: to test the applicant’s assertion that she was a citizen from Somalia, the 
Tribunal Officer asked her to tell the court what is on the back of the Somali five 
shilling note. The applicant’s counsel intervened: “[b]efore my client answers, can 
you tell me, Officer, what’s on the back of the Canadian five dollar bill?” The Officer 
could not.316 This episode points to the difficulty in assessing the plausibility of an 
applicant’s account based on conceptions of what a person should reasonably know if 
her story is truthful. In addition to decision-makers being unsuited to judge what is 
considered reasonable knowledge to have in the applicant’s situation given the 
differing cultural relevance of various pieces of information, the Canadian Officer 
demonstrates that it is easy to presume knowledge to be reasonable but nevertheless it 
is of little value as a test of credibility.   
 
7.3 Demeanour 
The demeanour of the applicant refers to her manner and non-verbal behaviour.317 As 
explained in chapter 4, demeanour is explicitly recognised as a ground for credibility 
assessments in several domestic systems, even though its value has been questioned 
by many. This is because research in psychology has demonstrated that the ability to 
distinguish between truthful and untruthful statements of assessed individuals is of 
low reliability, even amongst professionals that often conduct such evaluations.318 
There is also a gender aspect to such assessments: studies have shown that triers of 
fact identify typically male communication traits as traits of credibility.319 The 
problem of distinguishing between liars and truth-tellers is further complicated in a 
cross-cultural setting, where differing body language, gazes and manners of 
expression are often misinterpreted. Writing specifically about demeanour in the 
asylum process, Herlihy has observed that within a cross-cultural and psychologically 
complex context demeanour offers unreliable subjective indicators of credibility 
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assessments.320 As noted by Macklin, it is not that demeanour says nothing: however, 
the messages conveyed are indeterminate and contingent.321 In the context of the 
asylum procedure, an Australian judge warned that it is all too easy for the “subtle 
influences of demeanour” to “become a cloak, which conceals an unintended but 
nonetheless decisive bias.”322 In spite of these warnings, it cannot be denied that 
assessments of applicants’ demeanour do play important roles in many credibility 
determinations, though the written decisions may not explicitly refer to it as one of the 
grounds. For this reason, it is very difficult to analyse the impact of demeanour in an 
essay wholly based on written sources, and consequently it will only be briefly 
touched upon in this chapter.  
 
In the context of asylum credibility assessments, demeanour may have a bearing on 
the plausibility of the applicant being sincere in her statements, rather than on the 
inherent plausibility of the account as such. A rare example of a case where the 
decision-maker’s assumptions about the applicant’s demeanour were actually made 
explicit is provided by a US case deciding the claim of a Serbian applicant who 
sought asylum on grounds of being persecuted for his homosexuality.323 The first-
instance decision-maker held that the applicant was not credible, and the first reason 
offered for this finding was that, although the applicant “says that he is singled out for 
persecution because he is gay in his home country […] [t]he Court studied the 
demeanour of this individual very carefully throughout his testimony in Court today, 
and this gentleman does not appear to be overtly gay.” More specifically, the 
decision-maker observed that “it is not readily apparent to a person who would see 
this gentleman for the first time that [he is gay] since he bears no effeminate traits or 
any other traits that would mark him as a homosexual.”324 This decision was upheld 
on first appeal, but on further appeal to the Court of Appeals it was reversed, with the 
Court holding that “[t]hese stereotypes most assuredly are not substantial 
evidence.”325 In a sense, this particular applicant was fortunate in that the initial 
decision-maker explicitly set out his grounds of refusal, thus making them reviewable 
by the higher courts. It can only be speculated that many other decision-makers reach 
similar findings based on their interpretations of the applicant’s demeanour paired 
with their own stereotypes, but refrain from making explicit mention of this in their 
decisions and instead allow their judgment to swing against credibility on borderline 
assessments of some of the other credibility grounds.  
 
Another kind of demeanour assessment which rarely makes its way to the written 
decisions but which nonetheless plays a role in credibility findings concerns the level 
of emotions demonstrated by an applicant in telling her story. This was another 
feature noted by Spijkerboer during his research of Dutch asylum claims, and he 
concluded that “[i]n order to be considered credible, applicants must show the 
appropriate emotions at the appropriate moments.”326 This can be particularly difficult 
for women who have been tortured or traumatised, since it is common for sufferers of 
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PTSD or depression to appear withdrawn, uninterested and detached.327 Ironically, 
Melloy notes that “as the woman asylum applicant is trying to prove that she has been 
tortured or persecuted, it is that same torture or persecution that will lead many 
[decision-makers] not to believe her.”328 The tendency among decision-makers in 
Western states to require such displays of emotions is more detrimental to women 
than to men, for Western culture presumes that women communicate through their 
emotions and men through their ideas.329 This, too, is clearly based on stereotypical 
assumptions about how human beings react in given situations. Personal dispositions 
as well as cultural norms guide such behaviour, however. Lacking in-depth 
knowledge of both the applicant herself and most often also the social environment 
from which she has originated, the decision-maker is not apt to draw any conclusions 
as to the applicant’s credibility as a provider of evidence in support of her asylum 
claim based on such impressions about her demeanour.  
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8. Recommendations for improving 
the accuracy of credibility 
assessments 
 
Thus far, this thesis has demonstrated that the criteria currently being used for 
assessing the credibility of asylum seekers’ claims are full of pitfalls. This is not to 
say that they should be discarded altogether: methods for distinguishing fraudulent 
applicants from genuine refugees are plainly needed, as it cannot be denied that the 
asylum system is open to abuse by economic or other migrants who do not have a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted. The prevalent criteria for assessing credibility 
need to be qualified, however, in order to improve the accuracy of credibility 
assessments and guard applicants from some of the worst-reasoned findings. Many of 
the problems that have been raised in this thesis could surely be remedied if there was 
greater awareness among decision-makers about the reasons for why such problems 
arise. But the fact is that many national agencies have issued guidelines330 for asylum 
decision-makers that warn of at least some of the problems raised in the course of this 
thesis, notably the effects of PTSD and troubles in assessing plausibility. In spite of 
such guidelines, however, unsound credibility assessments continue to flourish. The 
grave consequences that may follow from erroneous credibility assessment render this 
absolutely unacceptable: there must be stricter safeguards against flawed assessments 
being made in the first place. Therefore, this thesis will make a number of 
recommendations as to how credibility assessments should be conducted, which it 
argues should be legally binding and enforceable in court if breached or ignored by 
decision-makers. It is to be noted that recommendations intended to be legally 
enforceable are very different from guidelines: the latter can be employed in some 
cases but not in others, whereas legislative provisions must be clear and equally 
applicable to all asylum claims. Not all of the problems identified in the foregoing 
chapters will be addressed in the recommendations, for some are simply unsuited for 
the strict format that laws equally applicable to all cases require. For example, 
although it is highly desirable that decision-makers understand the difference between 
thin and thick description, and the limited use that they can make of the first category, 
it is not possible to stipulate a threshold of what constitutes thick description which is 
consequently acceptable to use in the refugee status determination. This thesis has 
raised some issues which it is not capable of solving through legal remedies. Instead, 
it will focus on a few recommendations which could nevertheless have a significant 
impact on the way that credibility assessments are conducted. The chapter will begin 
by outlining a number of such recommendations as to how accuracy could be 
improved, and will conclude with a discussion of how these recommendations should 
be implemented.  
 
8.1 Improving the accuracy of credibility assessments 
It has been suggested that refugee law stands to learn about credibility assessments 
from international criminal law. Credibility assessments in refugee law and 
international criminal law have much in common: irrespective of the subsequent 
dissimilarity between the legal significance of testimony, the preliminary task of 
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assessing the credibility of alleged victims or witnesses of human rights violations is 
“identical.”331 Both areas of law must transcend geographic, linguistic, cultural, 
educational, and psychological barriers in order to conduct such assessments,332 and 
in this exercise they are more or less unique, with the exception of some international 
human rights committees.333 Refugee law should therefore look to international 
criminal law, for the latter has developed much clearer procedural standards for how 
credibility assessments should be made.334 The judges of the international tribunals 
have also taken a more proactive role in redressing the potential distortions in 
testimony, and according to Byrne this serves as a corrective mechanism for the 
modes and methods of communication that characterise human rights testimony.335 
Perhaps the main difference between the refugee law and international criminal law 
approaches lies in the “presumptive affirmation” view of the criminal judges,336 as 
compared to the “presumptive scepticism” which has been noted among asylum 
decision-makers by several commentators.337 Acknowledging the sharp contrast 
between the economic conditions of the administration of the two areas of law, it is 
nonetheless argued that asylum law could take on board some of the practices for 
assessing credibility that the international criminal tribunals employ. Some of the 
following recommendations will draw on practices adhered to in that area. 
 
8.1.1 Internal inconsistencies should be put to the applicant 
Internal inconsistencies in an applicant’s testimony may be the consequence of an ill-
rehearsed lie which the applicant forgets from time to time, leaving the applicant 
vulnerable to detailed questions by decision-makers and unable to recite the same 
story without contradictions. However, as discussed in chapter 5 above, internal 
inconsistencies may also result from common memory loss, exacerbated in the cases 
of victims of trauma and sufferers of PTSD. They could also stem from troubled 
communication through an interpreter, attributable to errors and mistakes, selective 
interpretation or choice of exact translation. Finally, internal inconsistencies are 
commonly derived from late disclosures of more or less central aspects of an 
applicant’s background story. Some asylum seekers suffer from one of these setbacks 
in their efforts to retell their experiences during the refugee status determination 
process. Others, however, may very well suffer from all three. Imagine, for example, 
a female asylum applicant who fears persecution on the basis of having been 
subjected to sexual torture in a society where sexuality is taboo and extremely 
personal. She may have developed PTSD as a consequence of her horrific 
experiences, and upon arrival in the country of asylum she must tell her story through 
an interpreter, possibly male, from her own community. Inconsistencies in her 
statement should not be disbelieved; they should be expected. Research from 
psychology, linguistic studies, sociology and social anthropology all indicate that 
internal inconsistency is in no way a waterproof measure of an applicant’s 
                                                
331 R. Byrne (2007) ‘Assessing Testimonial Evidence in Asylum Proceedings: Guiding Standards from 
the International Criminal Tribunals,; International Journal of Refugee Law 19:4, p. 616. 
332 R. Byrne (2007), ibid, p. 610. 
333 Regional courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights or the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights, are not at all to the same extent faced with the culture clashes of refugee status 
determination processes. 
334 R. Byrne (2007), supra note 331, p. 630. 
335 R. Byrne (2007), ibid, p. 637. 
336 R. Byrne (2007), ibid, p. 631. 
337 See, for example, D. Anker (1991), supra note 203, p. 451. 
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deceitfulness.338 Refugee law should take such insights very seriously, and therefore 
this thesis will recommend that internal inconsistencies should always be put to the 
applicant before the decision-maker reaches a final decision on the credibility issue. 
This will mean that the applicant is at least granted a chance to explain or comment 
upon the inconsistencies before they are used against her in a negative credibility 
decision. The confrontation when the applicant is asked to comment on any 
inconsistencies, and her reply to this, should be included in the written decision so 
that it can be confirmed that this requirement was adhered to. Once the 
inconsistencies have been put to the applicant and she has been given an opportunity 
to provide an explanation, it should be up to the decision-maker to decide whether the 
explanation is satisfactory or whether the inconsistency is so severe that it leaves 
those aspects of the applicant’s testimony not credible. This recommendation is 
similar to the general policy employed by UNHCR Eligibility Officers, which holds 
that negative credibility findings may not be based on inconsistencies that the 
applicant has not had the opportunity to explain.339 By way of comparison, 
international criminal law has held that the attachment of weight to inconsistencies 
from earlier hearings requires access to transcripts showing the questions posed,340 
and the evidentiary consequence of this is that the courtroom testimony is considered 
as the point of departure.341 
 
It can be questioned, however, whether a requirement to put inconsistent statements to 
the applicant goes far enough. Applicants that suffer from PTSD or memory loss for 
some other reason may not be able to explain why they do not remember certain 
events on some occasions of telling their stories, but remember them perfectly on 
others. The law is not to assume that applicants are in the least bit aware of the 
psychological conditions that they suffer from or the effects that these can have. 
Therefore, it should not follow from the obligation to put inconsistencies to applicants 
that just because an applicant is not able to formulate an explanation for the 
inconsistencies in question, she is automatically not credible in this respect. This is a 
good example of why credibility assessments must ultimately remain flexible and 
discretionary. They can never be conducted according to a standardised questionnaire, 
for they must be able to take account of an infinite number of variables. 
Recommendations such as this one should help to explain why inconsistent applicants 
may nevertheless be credible, but they should not block applicants from being found 
credible if they are not able to capitalise on the opportunity for explanation afforded 
to them.  
 
A requirement to put inconsistencies to applicants is much more relevant with regard 
to internal inconsistencies than external inconsistencies, and therefore this thesis only 
recommends that the former should be compulsory. Since the applicant is not 
responsible for, perhaps not even aware of, the external source, she cannot be 
expected to explain such a discrepancy, and the decision-maker should not put that 
                                                
338 For example, one physician with extensive of the UK asylum system has recommended that the 
determination of the accuracy of recall is not a valid component of refugee status determinations: J. 
Cohen (2001), supra note 186, p. 309. 
339 UNHCR, Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination under UNHCR’s Mandate, 20 
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340 The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case no. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence, Trial Chamber 
I, 20 January 2000, para. 85. 
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pressure on her. On the other hand, there are certainly situations where the decision-
maker should use her discretion to put an external inconsistency to an applicant 
nonetheless, for example in the case of the Zimbabwean applicant referred to above 
where a discrepancy as regards the age band of primary school students was found to 
be an inconsistency.  
 
8.1.2 Right of decision-maker to conduct fact-finding and call expert witnesses 
Chapter 6 discussed the assessment of the external consistency of applicants’ 
testimony, and noted some of the inherent difficulties of evaluating facts. This thesis 
argues that legal practitioners or administrative decision-makers are generally not 
well placed to make such assessments, because many do not possess a sufficient grasp 
of the wider social context in the country of origin where the ‘fact’ is located. For this 
reason, it is highly unfortunate that some decision-makers have hastily dismissed or 
disregarded the opinions offered by expert witnesses, and instead preferred to rely on 
their own interpretations of situations in countries of origin.342 The drawbacks of non-
experts selecting between different COI and subsequently applying this COI to 
various contexts is a difficult problem to address, since it cannot realistically be 
expected that asylum decision-makers could attain a high level of knowledge about all 
the countries of origin that applicants stem from. Judges and other decision-makers 
are not required to be experts in other areas than the law and its application. However, 
they should be encouraged to see that they may need assistance in conducting 
evaluations of external inconsistencies between applicants’ testimony and COI from 
various sources. One way to promote this could be to create a right of asylum 
decision-makers to conduct their own fact-finding about the situation in the country of 
origin, including a right to call expert witnesses in order to clarify the significance of 
factual uncertainties or valid applications of certain COI.343 This would preclude 
complete reliance on the particular sources presented by the parties. A similar right 
seems to exist within international criminal law: in Kupreškic,344 the ICTY exercised 
its authority to call its own witnesses, and this allowed for the evidence of an 
anthropologist to be entered into the trial record. With the help of this witness, a range 
of cultural and linguistic issues were addressed which enhanced the capacity of the 
Trial Court to assess the evidence.345 Alas, this recommended right constitutes a 
potentially very expensive measure and in practical terms it would need to be 
circumscribed in order to be viable. In principle, however, a measure of this sort is 
needed in order to improve assessments of external consistency leading to decisions 
about the credibility of applicants’ testimony. It should once again be noted that 
experts are likely to disagree on a whole range of things. Just like COI more 
generally, they may present different kinds of information as being decisive for a 
particular issue. They may explicitly adopt different views on a certain matter. In the 
end, it will therefore always have to be the accountable decision-maker that reaches 
the ultimate conclusion on whether external consistency has been established or not. 
By undertaking her own fact-finding, she will be able to make a better-informed 
                                                
342 See generally A. Good (2007), supra note 207, pp. 211-237; A. Good (2004:1), supra note 249; A. 
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decision – especially after having heard the views of experts in the field. In the 
context of appeals of human rights claims, the European Court of Human Rights has 
noted the importance of conducting independent fact-finding.346 UNHCR has also 
recommended that all appellate bodies as well as initial decision-makers should have 
fact-finding competence in order to fully satisfy the requirement of rigorous scrutiny 
establishes by international human rights law.347 
 
8.1.3 Plausibility assessments should be limited and clearly reasoned 
As argued in chapter 7 above, assessments of what is plausible and what is not are not 
suitable for cross-cultural milieus. Thus, assessments of inherent implausibilities of an 
applicant’s testimony are not an accurate measurement of the credibility of the 
applicant’s statements. Again, the very particular situations of asylum claims have to 
be remembered, and plausibility assessments can never be based on tenets drawn from 
the decision-maker’s own social context. Because this context is more or less 
impossible to disregard and because the decision-maker usually does not possess 
extensive knowledge of the corresponding context of the applicant – this thesis 
maintains that COI cannot provide such knowledge – plausibility assessments are not 
a suitable tool for evaluating credibility in the refugee status determination process. 
Consequently, this thesis suggests that their use as a tool in assessing applicants’ 
credibility should be severely limited. They should not be considered as one of the 
main requirements that credible testimony must fulfil. In cases where they are 
nonetheless relied on, decision-makers should be required to spell out in the written 
decision the reasoning behind the implausibility finding.348 It should further be 
clarified that ‘reasonableness’ and ‘common sense’ are not appropriate concepts to be 
employed in assessing plausibility, since persecutors and frightened applicants cannot 
be expected to act as reasonable persons, and since ‘common sense’ inevitably varies 
over space and time.  
 
8.1.4 Demeanour should not be an element of credibility 
It has been widely ascertained by psychological studies that assessments of 
demeanour are too unreliable to accurately assess whether a witness is telling the truth 
or not.349 In light of this, it is argued that evaluations of demeanour are not 
appropriate in assessing the credibility of asylum applicants, considering that the 
outcome of such assessments could be a matter of life and death. Consequently, they 
should be explicitly excluded from credibility assessments. The evidence on the 
unreliability of demeanour applications renders their explicit approval by several 
domestic frameworks more than a little surprising, and several commentators have 
argued for demeanour’s active exclusion from credibility grounds.350 Furthermore, 
negative findings of demeanour tend to influence the whole of an applicant’s 
testimony, thus diminishing the possibility of having some aspects of the testimony 
accepted as credible and reliable evidence whereas others are not. Higher courts have 
often held that this should be a possibility, since telling lies does not serve to exclude 
                                                
346 Salah Sheekh v. The Netherlands, Application no. 1948/04, Third Section, Judgment, 11 January 
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an applicant from the scope of the Refugee Convention. An asylum seeker who 
embellishes her story in some aspects but tells it honestly in its main aspects should 
be able to have parts of her testimony accepted as credible. If a negative finding is 
reached on her demeanour, however, this is likely to impact the assessment of the 
totality of her testimony. This is a further reason for why demeanour should never be 
relied on as an indicator of credibility. 
 
8.1.5 Credibility decisions should be reviewable on appeal 
Based on the survey of a sample of domestic frameworks for credibility assessments 
conducted in chapter 4, it appears that most national systems do allow for reviews of 
the factual findings of asylum claims. Judging by the potential for inaccurate 
decisions which has been addressed earlier in this thesis, however, a de novo review 
of the facts should be a guarantee for all applicants. Therefore, this thesis 
recommends that all asylum applicants should be entitled to at least one appeal that 
tries the facts of the case anew, including an assessment of the applicant’s credibility.  
 
8.2 Giving effect to the recommendations 
In light of the extensive complications that follow from the practical application of the 
Refugee Convention with regards to assessing the facts by evaluating the credibility 
of asylum applicants, it is here suggested that there should be international laws in 
place to dictate some procedural standards of refugee status determinations. A proper 
application of the Refugee Convention requires effective procedures, too. The 
purpose of the Refugee Convention – to offer asylum to persons in need who meet the 
criteria laid down therein – cannot be fulfilled if applicants are not able to surmount 
the factual stage of the asylum application and render their testimony credible as 
evidence. As was discussed in chapter 3, in domestic systems where a ‘combined 
approach’ to well-founded fear of being persecuted has been adopted, decision-
makers are often rather unwilling to assess an applicant’s claim in the absence of a 
credible testimony which can establish the subjective element of fear. To some extent, 
this applies to decision-makers that adopt the ‘objective’ approach, too, since ‘being 
persecuted’ also relies on a sort of subjective element. It can be argued that the 
absence of common standards for all parties to the Refugee Convention as to how 
credibility assessments should be conducted leaves contracting states a wide 
discretion in how they implement the Convention. First-instance asylum decision-
makers, in particular, tend to be employees of governmental agencies and these 
agencies may be highly influenced by the immigration policies of the day. As noted 
by Taylor, administrative adjudication is not simply about deciding individual cases, 
but also a means to effectuate statutes in accordance with the priorities of the 
executive branch.351 For several decades now, immigration policies have grown more 
and more restrictive in most Western countries. Loosely regulated standards as to how 
credibility should be assessed can be used to give effect to societal attitudes to 
immigration more generally, and this can be done without any apparent violation of 
the Refugee Convention. In this way, credibility assessments can be employed to give 
effect to restrictive immigration policies; here, the culture of disbelief has been 
allowed to flourish. This is, of course, further exaggerated by statutory legislation 
such as the US REAL ID Act, which explicitly holds that demeanour is a grounds for 
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assessing credibility and that even small inconsistencies not going to the heart of the 
claim can affect overall credibility.  
 
The UNHCR Handbook – a non-binding instrument which nevertheless commands 
substantial authority – has indeed set out some common procedural standards.352 But 
it has remained silent with regard to how credibility assessments should be 
conducted,353 noting in passing “the unlikelihood that all States bound by the 1951 
Convention […] could establish identical procedures.”354 Of course, this is a highly 
realistic concern. One UNHCR report has observed that differences of terminology, 
procedural rules governing refugee status determinations, and between common and 
civil law systems make it more difficult to agree on international standards for 
assessing refugee status.355 Consequently, states have shown a reluctance to open the 
discussion on how the rules and standards on evidentiary questions are dealt with.356 
Irrespective of these hindrances, it is clearly desirable that efforts are made to create 
common international standards for how credibility assessments should – and should 
not – be conducted. A consistent and accurate evaluation of asylum applicants’ 
credibility is important for several reasons. Firstly, the two principles of certainty and 
equal treatment require that an applicant should receive the same decision to her 
asylum claim no matter where she applies for asylum, and no matter who decides her 
case.357 Since the evaluation of fact is to some extent always subjective, this is almost 
impossible to achieve. But the legal doctrines of certainty and equal treatment require 
that such discretionary elements should be minimised. A better regulated international 
system for how credibility assessments are conducted would promote these principles. 
Secondly, disparate interpretations are contrary to international law. As noted by Lord 
Steyn in Ex parte Adan, the Refugee Convention must be given an independent 
meaning derivable from the sources mentioned in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, and without taking colour from distinctive 
features of the legal system of any individual contracting state.358 It is clear that the 
role that credibility assessments are allowed to play in refugee status determinations 
renders the application of the Refugee Convention open to interpretation in a way that 
international law is not supposed to be. Thirdly, the point of international laws 
pertaining to human rights is to progressively raise minimum standards in all 
contracting states, and thus international laws can serve to inspire better procedures in 
all states that are parties to the Refugee Convention. Effective procedures are an 
inherent element of the fulfilment of the international obligations that contracting 
states have already agreed to by ratifying the Refugee Convention, and thus it should 
not be a great leap to adopt laws for such procedures in order to further the 
application of the Convention.  
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Since the Refugee Convention was adopted in 1951, international and national legal 
standards and practices have evolved significantly.359 International law may not have 
been ready for common procedural standards in the early 1950s, but the situation has 
changed and today our evolved knowledge and legal infrastructure should make it 
possible to adopt such standards. To some extent, this has already happened even in 
the field of refugee law by way of the EU’s Procedures Directive and the 
Qualifications Directive. This thesis will therefore suggest that certain procedural 
standards with regard to how credibility assessments are conducted should be 
incorporated in international law. Political reality would likely preclude the possibility 
of an amendment to the Refugee Convention, but an additional protocol could with 
time better align domestic asylum procedures and increase the accuracy of credibility 
assessments worldwide. In addition, an amendment of the UNHCR Handbook giving 
effect to the recommendations set out in the foregoing section could also serve as an 
important step in the right direction. However, in spite of the high regard that many 
decision-makers show towards the Handbook, its recommendations are not legally 
enforceable. Several countries of arrival have issued their own guidelines as to how 
credibility should be assessed, and the risk is that the Handbook would end up being 
treated as any other such document – much used by committed and caring decision-
makers, but possible to ignore for others. The importance of refugee status demands 
that guidance on credibility assessments should not be possible to ignore. By turning 
some of its fundamental standards into international law, this would no longer be an 
option.  
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9. Conclusion 
 
Credibility assessments are an integral part of refugee status determinations. Since the 
burden of proof in the asylum claim rests with the applicant, it is she that must adduce 
the evidence to meet the requisite standard of proof. In most refugee status 
determinations, this will be nearly impossible if the applicant’s own testimony is not 
accepted as evidence building towards that standard. In recognition of the difficult 
situation of the applicant, the principle of the benefit of the doubt is widely recognised 
to assist her when she has made a serious effort to substantiate her claim and when 
her account is “coherent and plausible.”360 This is the first and most widely 
recognised reason for why credibility is so central to refugee recognition, but this 
thesis argues that there is another reason, too. Irrespective of whether the decision-
maker takes a ‘combined’ or an ‘objective’ approach to the elements of a ‘well-
founded fear of being persecuted,’ in reality the claim for asylum is almost doomed to 
fail if the applicant’s testimony is not found to be credible and thus acceptable as 
evidence. A decision-maker who adopts a ‘combined’ approach is unlikely to be 
satisfied that the applicant fears being persecuted if she is not also credible, as ‘fear’ 
is based on the subjective feelings of the applicant, communicated through her own 
testimony. Further, a decision-maker who belongs to the ‘objective’ school will 
nonetheless not be satisfied that the applicant is ‘being persecuted’ if her testimony 
cannot be used to establish that the risk amounts to persecution in her particular case. 
Thus, credibility plays two central roles in refugee status determinations: it is essential 
both for producing the kinds of evidence that can establish some of the inherent 
elements of the refugee definition, and for giving the applicant the benefit of the 
doubt and thus helping her meet the general standard of proof where she is not able to 
conclusively prove her claim.  
 
In spite of the central importance of credibility in establishing refugee status, there is 
little international guidance on how it is to be assessed. Domestic frameworks have 
developed some structures for how such evaluations are to be conducted, but in most 
cases these are rough guidelines that leave considerable discretion for the decision-
maker and which are not enforceable in law if they are departed from. Three principal 
grounds of credibility can be deduced from the international and the domestic 
frameworks alike: internal consistency, external consistency, and plausibility. This 
thesis has demonstrated that all these grounds are highly problematic as bases for 
credibility assessments in the cross-cultural setting of the refugee status 
determination. The internal consistency of an applicant’s testimony is easily 
undermined by memory failures, which are frequently aggravated when applicants are 
suffering from PTSD. Furthermore, the widespread use of interpreters in asylum 
processes often gives rise to inconsistencies in applicants’ testimony from one 
interview or tribunal hearing to another. Late disclosures of central aspects of 
applicants’ background stories resulting in inconsistencies can also very often be 
rationally explained in the context of refugee status determinations: many applicants 
experience a profound distrust in state officials as a consequence of having been 
persecuted by such actors. In addition, applicants of both sexes that have been 
subjected to sexual torture or abuse are often reluctant to discuss such events with 
decision-makers and other parties to the asylum process. In spite of this range of 
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possible explanations for internal inconsistencies in applicants’ testimony, such 
inconsistencies continue to be used by decision-makers to cast doubt on applicants’ 
credibility, and may end up as decisive factors in dismissing it.  
 
The problems of assessing the external consistency of applicants’ testimony are not as 
widely recognised. It is apparent that decision-makers do not routinely question their 
own ability to compare an applicant’s account of events in the country of origin with 
that of COI from other sources. Yet, this thesis argues that decision-makers are 
generally not well placed to conduct this task, since they lack the wider knowledge of 
the societies in question that is needed to make such assessments. Decision-makers 
commonly rely on ‘thin descriptions’ derived from COI, whereas access to and 
understanding of ‘thick descriptions’ – explaining the underlying structures of the 
societies in question – would be needed in order to authoritatively pronounce on 
whether the applicant’s testimony corresponds to information from other sources. 
Further, in the process of assessing external consistency many decision-makers place 
too much emphasis on ‘facts’ and commonly fail to recognise and take account of the 
contested nature of all types of knowledge. In this respect, the practical application of 
refugee law has much to learn from the social sciences.  
 
Finally, the third ground of credibility constitutes the most problematic assessment of 
them all. Assessing the plausibility of an applicant’s testimony is a task that the 
decision-maker in the country of arrival is not fit to conduct, given her limited and 
culturally bound understanding of what plausibility, reasonability or common sense 
entail in the setting where the alleged events took place. In the view of the present 
author, this applies to demeanour assessments, too, and to most forms of knowledge 
tests. Asylum decision-making cannot be based on the assumption of the decision-
maker, but in plausibility assessments, they commonly are.  
 
In light of the importance that credibility assessments carry, it is easy to lose sight of 
the fact that credibility is not actually a criterion of the refugee definition. As Kagan 
reminds us, a person does not need to be credible in order to be a refugee.361 Based on 
the problematic nature of credibility assessments in cross-cultural asylum procedures, 
it is worth asking whether we need to engage in them at all. Sadly, it is clear that 
many people feel an incentive to manipulate the refugee protection system in order to 
gain access to, primarily, Western countries. In this situation, the credibility 
assessment as a part of the refugee status determination is indeed a “necessary 
evil.”362 Credibility assessments are needed to weed out fraudulent applicants from 
genuine ones, so that the refugee system can be kept intact and thus continue to 
protect persons in need of asylum for a Convention reason. If the status determination 
procedures were to accept all those whose testimony meet the legal refugee definition 
without having regard to the applicant’s credibility, we would likely experience a 
considerable surge in applications for and grants of asylum. This would probably lead 
to a loss of public confidence and support for refugee protection, which in the long 
run would threaten the whole institution. Having said that, the refugee status 
determination process clearly needs better and more stringent procedures for 
conducting credibility assessments. The ultimate goal must be that not a single 
applicant should be wrongfully disbelieved when she tells her story in her own 
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manner, as she has experienced events from her own perspective. With this objective 
in mind, this thesis has suggested that common international laws should be created in 
order to safeguard all asylum applicants’ rights to have their credibility assessed in 
ways that will delimit the risk of flawed and inaccurate evaluations. In addition to 
these specific recommendations, this thesis argues for an interdisciplinary approach to 
credibility assessments363 that better recognises the problems that legal formalism can 
lead to in the context of refugee status determinations and human rights testimony 
more generally. Hopefully, these recommendations could go some way towards 
guarding against what Thomas has described as the most intractable issue in the 
assessment of credibility: “the decision-makers’ own presence of self,” and the values 
they inevitably bring to the task of deciding whether a story is credible.364 Decision-
makers must always take care to remind themselves of the role that their own persona 
play in assessing the protection needs of asylum applicants.  
 
In a sense, the right to enjoy asylum365 is the ultimate human right: it holds that the 
individual has value beyond her own state and government in case they severely 
mistreat her. It proves that her worth is not confined by the social group she was born 
into. Simply put, it is a right that is to be respected, protected and fulfilled by other 
states than the applicant’s own. All states that take their human rights obligations 
seriously should be proud to play a part in upholding this right. It is true that the 
granting of refugee status and the costs of status determination procedures test 
international solidarity like few other international obligations do. Governments and 
decision-makers alike may feel a need to curb application success rates, and this could 
be part of the explanation why credibility assessments are not more strictly regulated. 
But the effect, intended or not, is that some applicants who genuinely have a well-
founded fear of being persecuted are refused asylum. We must use all the knowledge 
that we have, from a broad range of disciplines and fora, to prevent this from 
happening. 
                                                
363 This has been suggested by several commentators on the topic: see, for example, B. Einhorn (2009), 
supra note 209, p. 197. 
364 R. Thomas (2006), supra note 121, p. 84. 
365 UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, Article 14. 
 69 
Bibliography 
 
 
Journal articles 
 
Anker, D. (1991) ‘Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on 
the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment,’ 
New York University Review of Law and Social Change 19, pp. 433-528. 
 
Barnes, J. (2004) ‘Expert Evidence – The Judicial Perception in Asylum and Human 
Rights Appeals,’ International Journal of Refugee Law 16:3, pp. 349-357. 
 
Belli, R. F.; Shay, W. L. and Stafford, F. P. (2001) ‘Event history calendars and 
question list surveys: A direct comparison of interviewing methods,’ Public Opinion 
Quarterly 65, pp. 45-74. 
 
Bingham, T. (1985) ‘The Judge as Juror: The Judicial Determination of Factual 
Issues,’ Current Legal Problems 38, pp. 1-27. 
 
Byrne, R. (2007) ‘Assessing Testimonial Evidence in Asylum Proceedings: Guiding 
Standards from the International Criminal Tribunals,’ International Journal of 
Refugee Law 19:4, pp. 609-638. 
 
Bögner, D.; Brewin, C. and Herlihy, J. (2010) ‘Refugees’ Experiences of Home 
Office Interviews: A Qualitative Study on the Disclosure of Sensitive Personal 
Information,’ Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 36:3, pp. 519-535. 
 
Cameron, H. (2008) ‘Risk Theory and “Subjective Fear:” The Role of Risk 
Perception, Assessment, and Management in Refugee Status Determinations,’ 
International Journal of Refugee Law 20:4, pp. 576-585. 
 
Cameron, H. (2010) ‘Refugee Status Determinations and the Limits of Memory,’ 
International Journal of Refugee Law 22:4, pp. 469-511. 
 
Care, G. (2004) ‘The Judiciary, the State, and the Refugee: The Evolution of Judicial 
Protection in Asylum – A U.K. Perspective,’ Fordham International Law Journal 28, 
pp. 1421-1456. 
 
Christianson, S. A. and Hübinette, B. (1993) ‘Hands up! A study of witnesses’ 
emotional reactions and memories associated with bank robberies,’ Applied Cognitive 
Psychology 7, pp. 365-379. 
 
Coffey, G. (2003) ‘The Credibility of Credibility Evidence at the Refugee Review 
Tribunal,’ International Journal of Refugee Law 15:3, pp. 377-417. 
 
Cohen, J. (2001) ‘Questions of Credibility: Omissions, Discrepancies and Errors of 
Recall in the Testimony of Asylum Seekers,’ International Journal of Refugee Law 
13, pp. 293-309. 
 
 70 
Dunning, D. and Stern, L. B. (1992)‘Examining the generality of eyewitness 
hypermnesia: a close look at time delay and question type,’ Applied Cognitive 
Psychology 6, pp. 643-657. 
 
Friedman, W. J. (1993) ‘Memory for the time of past events,’ Psychological Bulletin 
113, pp. 44-66. 
 
Good, A. (2004:1) ‘Expert Evidence in Asylum and Human Rights Appeals: an 
Expert’s View,’ International Journal of Refugee Law 16:3, pp. 358-380. 
 
Good, A. (2004:2) ‘Undoubtedly an Expert? Anthropologists in British Asylum 
Courts,’ Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 10, pp. 113-133. 
 
Granhag, P. and Strömwall, L. (2002) ‘Repeated Interrogations: Verbal and Non-
verbal Cues to Deception,’ Applied Cognitive Psychology 16, pp. 243-257. 
 
Granhag, P.; Strömwall, L. and Hartwig, M. (2005) ‘Granting Asylum or Not: 
Migration Board Personnel’s Beliefs about Deception,’ Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies 31:1, pp. 29-50. 
 
Hathaway, J. and Hicks, W. (2004) ‘Is there a Subjective Element in the Refugee 
Convention’s Requirement of “Well-Founded Fear?”’ Michigan Journal of 
International Law 26, pp. 505-562. 
 
Herlihy, J.; Gleeson, K. and Turner, S. (2010) ‘What Assumptions about Human 
Behaviour Underlie Asylum Judgments?’ International Journal of Refugee Law 22:3, 
pp. 351-366. 
 
Herlitz, G. (1994) ‘The meaning of the term “prima facie,”’ Louisiana Law Review 
55:2, pp. 391-408. 
 
Kagan, M. (2002) ‘Is Truth in the Eye of the Beholder? Objective Credibility 
Assessment in Refugee Status Determination,’ Georgetown Immigration Law 
Journal, 17, pp. 367-415. 
 
Kälin, W. (1986) ‘Troubled Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings in the 
Asylum-Hearing,’ International Migration Review 20:2, pp. 230-241. 
 
Legomsky, S. (2007) ‘Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the Limits 
to Consistency,’ Stanford Law Review 60, pp. 413-474. 
 
Mack, K. (1993) ‘Continuing Barriers to Women’s Credibility: A Feminist 
Perspective on the Proof of Process,’ Criminal Law Forum 4, pp. 327-353. 
 
Melander, G. (1974) ‘The Protection of Refugees,’ Scandinavian Studies in Law 18, 
pp. 151-178. 
 
Melloy, K. (2007) ‘Telling Truths: How the REAL ID Act’s Credibility Provisions 
Affect Women Asylum Seekers,’ Iowa Law Review 92, pp. 637-676. 
 
 71 
Montrose, L. J. (1954) ‘Basic concepts of the law of evidence,’ The Law Quarterly 
Review 70, pp. 527-555. 
 
Norman, S. (2007) ‘Assessing the Credibility of Refugee Applicants: A Judicial 
Perspective,’ International Journal of Refugee Law 19:2, pp. 273-292. 
 
Rousseau, C.; Crépeau, F.; Foxen, P. and Houle, F. (2002) ‘The Complexity of 
Determining Refugeehood: A Multidisciplinary Analysis of the Decision-making 
Process of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board,’ Journal of Refugee Studies 
15:1, pp. 43-70. 
 
Sarkar, S, (2009) ‘Truth Without Consequences: Reality and Recall in Refugees 
Fleeing Persecution,’ Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, 
37, pp. 6-10.  
 
Strömwall, L.; Granhag, P. and Jonsson, A.-C. (2003) ‘Deception among pairs: “Let’s 
say we had lunch together and hope they will swallow it!”’ Psychology, Crime & Law 
9:2, pp. 109-124.  
 
Sweeney, J. (2009) ‘Credibility, Proof and Refugee Law,’ International Journal of 
Refugee Law 21:4, pp. 700-726. 
 
Taylor, M. (2007) ‘Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The Déjà Vu 
of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication,’ Stanford Law Review 60, pp. 475-
501.  
 
Thomas, R. (2006) ‘Assessing the Credibility of Asylum Claims: EU and UK 
Approaches Examined,’ European Journal of Migration and Law 8, pp. 79-96. 
 
Thomas, R. (2008) ‘Consistency in Asylum Adjudication: Country Guidance and the 
Asylum Process in the United Kingdom,’ International Journal of Refugee Law 20:4, 
pp. 489-532. 
 
Weston, A. (1998) ‘“A witness of truth” – credibility findings in asylum appeals,’ 
Immigration and Nationality Law and Practice 12, pp. 87-89. 
 
Weis, P. (1960) ‘The Concept of the Refugee in International Law,’ Journal du Droit 
International 87:2, pp. 928-978. 
 
 
Books and chapters 
 
Berk-Seligson, S. (1990) The bilingual courtroom, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
 
Bohmer, C. and Shuman, A. (2008) Rejecting Refugees – Political asylum in the 21st 
century, London: Routledge. 
 
Clayton, G. (2010) Immigration and Asylum Law, 4th edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
 72 
 
Das, V. (2007) Life and words: violence and the descent into the ordinary, Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
 
Doornbos, N. (2005) ‘On Being Heard in Asylum Cases: Evidentiary Assessment 
Through Asylum Interviews’ in Proof, Evidentiary Assessment, and Credibility in 
Asylum Proceedings (G. Noll ed.), Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 103-122. 
 
Einhorn, B. (2009) ‘Consistency, Credibility, and Culture’ in Refugee Roulette: 
Disparities in Asylum Adjudication and Proposals for Reform (J. Rami-Nogales; A. 
Schoenholtz; P. Schrag eds.), New York: New York University Press, pp. 187-201.  
 
Geertz, C. (1983) ‘Common Sense as a Cultural System,’ in Local Knowledge: 
Further Essays in Interpretative Anthropology, New York: Basic Books. 
 
Good, A. (2007) Anthropology and Expertise in the Asylum Courts, London: 
Routledge. 
 
Goodwin-Gill, G. (2010) ‘The Search for the One, True Meaning…’ in The Limits of 
Transnational Law (G. Goodwin-Gill and H. Lambert eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 204-241.  
 
Goodwin-Gill, G. and McAdam, J. (2007) The Refugee in International Law, 3rd 
edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Grahl-Madsen, A. (1966) The Status of Refugees in International Law: Volume I – 
Refugee Character, Leiden: Sijthoff. 
 
Hathaway, J. (1991) The Law of Refugee Status, Toronto: Butterworths. 
 
Herlihy, J. (2005) ‘Evidentiary Assessments and Psychological Difficulties’ in Proof, 
Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility in Asylum Procedures (Noll, G. ed.), Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 123-140. 
 
Jackson, D. (1999) Immigration Law and Practice, 2nd edition, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
 
Kaparadis, A. (1997) Psychology and Law: A Critical Introduction, Cambridge: CUP. 
 
Macdonald, I. and Webber, F. (2005) Immigration law and practice in the United 
Kingdom, London: LexisNexis Butterworths. 
 
Noll, G. (2005) ‘Evidentiary Assessment under the Refugee Convention: Risk, Pain 
and the Intersubjectivity of Fear’, in Proof, Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility in 
Asylum Procedures (Noll, G. ed.), Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 141-159. 
 
Ryle, G. (1971) Collected Papers, Volume Two, London: Hutchinson. 
 
 
 
 73 
Spijkerboer, T. (2005) ‘Stereotyping and Acceleration – Gender, Procedural 
Acceleration and Marginalised Judicial Review in the Dutch Asylum System,’ in 
Proof, Evidentiary Assessment and Credibility in Asylum Procedures (Noll, G. ed.), 
Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 67-102. 
 
Sweeney, J. (2007) ‘The Lure of “Facts” in Asylum Appeals: Critiquing the Practice 
of Judges’ in Applying Theory to Policy and Practice: Issues fir Critical Reflection 
(Steve, S. ed.), Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 19-35. 
 
Tuitt, P. (1996) False Images: The Law’s Construction of the Refugee, London: Pluto 
Press. 
 
Wikrén, G. and Sandesjö, H. (2008) Utlänningslagen med kommentarer, 8th edition, 
Stockholm: Nordstedts Juridik. 
 
Zimmermann, A. (2011) The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
 
UN publications 
 
UN General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948. 
 
UNHCR, Asylum Trends 2012: Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, 21 
March 2013. 
 
UNHCR, Common burdens and standards: legal elements in assessing claims for 
refugee status, 3 October 2002, ISSN 1020-7473. 
 
UNHCR, Country of Origin Information: Towards Enhanced International 
Cooperation, February 2004.  
 
UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 1: Gender-Related Persecution 
Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 7 May 2002, HCR/GIP/02/01.  
 
UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status 
under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refuges, 
December 2011, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3. 
 
UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures Comparative Analysis and 
Recommendations for Law and Practice: Key Findings and Recommendations on 
Credibility and Country of Origin Information, March 2010. 
 
UNHCR, Measuring Protection by Numbers (2005), November 2006. 
 
UNHCR, Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims, 16 December 
1998.  
 
 74 
UNHCR, Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination under UNHCR’s 
Mandate, 20 November 2003. 
 
 
Other publications 
 
Amnesty International, A question of credibility: Why so many initial asylum 
decisions are overturned on appeal in the UK, April 2013. 
 
Asylum Aid, Unsustainable: the quality of initial decision-making in women’s asylum 
claims, January 2011. 
 
Feijen, L. and Frennmark, E. (2011) Kvalitet i svensk asylprövning: En studie av 
Migrationsverkets utredning av och beslut om internationellt skydd, Stockholm: 
Migrationsverket.  
 
Hathaway, J.  (1993) Rebuilding Trust – Report of the Review of Fundamental Justice 
in Information Gathering and Dissemination at the Immigration and Refugee Board 
of Canada.  
 
Immigration Advisory Service, The Refugee Roulette: The Role of Country 
Information in Refugee Status Determination, January 2010. 
 
Immigration Advisory Service, The Use of Country of Origin Information in Refugee 
Status Determination: Critical Perspectives, May 2009. 
 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, Assessment of Credibility in Claims for 
Refugee Protection, 31 January 2004. 
 
Macklin, A. ‘Truth or Consequence: Credibility Determinations in the Refugee 
Context,’ International Association of Refugee Law Judges: Ottawa, Canada, 14-16 
October 1998. 
 
Refugee Review Tribunal (Australia), Guidance on the Assessment of Credibility, 
October 2006. 
 
Storey, H. ‘Judicial Criteria for Assessing Country of Origin Information (COI): A 
Checklist. International Association of Refugee Law Judges World Conference: 
Mexico City, 6-9 November 2006.  
 
United Kingdom Border Agency, Considering Asylum Claims and Assessing 
Credibility, 25 March 2011. 
 
University of Michigan Law School, International Refugee Law: The Michigan 
Guidelines on Well-Founded Fear, 28 March 2004.  
 
 
 
 
 
 75 
Legislation 
 
Australia 
 
Migration Act 1958.  
 
 
Canada 
 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001. 
 
Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, S.C. 2012. 
 
 
The European Union 
 
Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status, 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005. 
 
Council Directive on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need 
international protection and the content of the protection granted, 2004/83/EC of 29 
April 2004. 
 
 
International law 
 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 28 July 1951, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 189, p. 137.  
 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 606, p. 267. 
 
 
Sweden 
 
Utlänningslag (Aliens Act), 2005:716. 
 
Förvaltningsprocesslag (The Administrative Court Procedure Act), 1971:291. 
 
Proposition 2004/05:170, Ny instans- och processordning i utlännings- och 
medborgarskapsärenden, Stockholm: Utrikesdepartementet.  
 
 
The United Kingdom 
 
Immigration Rules, HC 394, 23 May 1994. 
 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004. 
 
 76 
The United States 
 
8 U.S.C. § 1158. 
 
8 C.F.R. § 1003. 
 
 
Websites 
 
UN Treaty Collection, Chapter V: Refugees and Stateless Persons, 
http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsII.aspx?&src=UNTSONLINE&mtdsg_no=V~
2&chapter=5&Temp=mtdsg2&lang=en, last accessed on 22 May 2013. 
 
Australian Refugee Review Tribunal, About us, http://www.mrt-rrt.gov.au/About-
Us/Our-role-and-services.aspx, last accessed on 22 May 2013. 
 
United Kingdom Border Agency, Country of origin information service, 
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/coi/, last accessed on 22 
May 2013. 
 77 
Table of cases 
 
 
Australia  
 
1205075 [2012] RRTA 851, 19 September 2012. 
 
1114411 [2012] RRTA 378, 13 June 2012. 
 
Abebe v. The Commonwealth; Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
[1999] HCA 14, 14 April 1999. 
 
Chan v. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs [1989] HCA 62, 12 September 
1989. 
 
Muin and Lie v. Refugee Review Tribunal (2002) HCA 30, 8 August 2002. 
 
Kathiresan v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (unreported), 
Federal Court of Australia, 4 March 1998. 
 
VBAM of 2002 v. Refugee Review Tribunal [2003] FCA 504, 22 May 2003. 
 
 
Canada 
 
Adjedi v. Minister of Employment and Immigration [1989] 2 FC 680. 
 
Chan v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) [1995] 3 S.C.R. 593. 
 
Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689. 
 
Danquah, Ama v. SSC (F.C.T.D. no IMM-105-94), MacKay, 17 November 1994. 
 
Gracielome v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989) 9 Imm. L. 
R. (2d) 237 (FCA). 
 
Jiang v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (2008) F.C. 775. 
 
Kong v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1994) 23 Imm. L. R. 
(2d) 179 (F.C.T.D.). 
 
Lai v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1989) 8 Imm. L. R. (2d) 
245 (FCA). 
 
Maldonado v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) (1980) 2 F.C. 302 
(CA).  
 
Minister for Immigration. and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs. v. Kord, [2002] 
125 F.C.R. 68, 69 (Full Fed. Ct. 2002). 
 78 
Parameshvaran, Appuchurai v. Minister for Citizenship and Immigration (F.C.D.T. 
no IMM-4131-94), Richard, 26 June 1995. 
 
Rajaratnam v. Canada (Minister for Employment and Immigration) (1991) 135 N.R. 
300 (FCA).  
 
Rodriguez Reyna v. Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (2008) FC 1044.  
 
Yaliniz v. Canada (Minister for Employment and Immigration) (1989) 7 Imm. L. R. 
(2d) 163 (FCA). 
 
 
European Court of Human Rights 
 
Salah Sheekh v. The Netherlands, Application no. 1948/04, Third Section, Judgment, 
11 January 2007. 
 
N.A. v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 25904/07, Fourth Section, Judgment, 17 
July 2008. 
 
 
Ireland 
 
I.A.Y. v. Refugee Appeals Tribunal and the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform, Attorney General and Ireland [2009] IEHC 127. 
 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 
The Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case no. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment and Sentence, 
Trial Chamber I, 20 January 2000.  
 
The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case no. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, Chamber I, 
2 September 1998. 
 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia 
 
The Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Josipovic, Papic, and Vladimir Santic, IT-95-16-T, 
Judgment, Trial Chamber, 14 January 2000.  
 
 
Sweden 
 
MIG 2007:12, Migrationsöverdomstolen (Swedish Migration Court of Appeal), UM 
540-06, 19 March 2007. 
 
MIG 2011:6, Migrationsöverdomstolen (Swedish Migration Court of Appeal), UM 
3363-10, 9 March 2011. 
 
 79 
The United Kingdom 
 
Asuming v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Appl. No. 11530, 
unreported. 
 
Chiver v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Appl. No. 10758, unreported, 
cited in I. Macdonald and F. Webber (2005) Immigration law and practice in the 
United Kingdom, London: LexisNexis Butterworths, pp. 814-815. 
 
E. and R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 49, 2 
February 2004. 
 
JT (Cameroon) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 
878, 28 July 2008. 
 
JO (Nigeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 318. 
 
K and Others (FGM) The Gambia v Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2013] UKUT 00062 (IAC), 8 April 2013. 
 
Karanakaran v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] EWCA Civ 11, 
25 January 2000. 
 
Koyazia Kaja v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, HX/7-673/93 
(11038), United Kingdom: Asylum and Immigration Tribunal / Immigration 
Appellate Authority, 10 June 1994. 
 
Nishanthan v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, unreported, 11 April 
2001, Immigration Appeals Tribunal, cited in A. Good (2007) Anthropology and 
Expertise in the Asylum Courts, London: Routledge, p. 202. 
 
R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Adan, CO/872/98, House 
of Lords (Judicial Committee), 2 April 1998. 
 
R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Adan, Ex parte Aitseguer,  
House of Lords (Judicial Committee), 19 December 2000. 
 
R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Robinson [1998] QB 929, 
11 July 1997. 
 
R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Sivakumaran and others 
[1988] AC 958, 16 December 1987. 
 
PS (Sri Lanka) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 
1213, 6 November 2008. 
 
SM v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (Section 8: Judge’s process) Iran 
[2005] UKAIT 00016. 
 
 
 80 
The United States  
 
Agbor v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 499 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 
Anderson v. City of Bessmor, 470 US 564 (1985). 
 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
 
Mousa v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 
Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 
Todorovic v. U.S. Attorney General, No. 09-11652 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 
 
